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THESIS

**ENABLING PERSISTENT PEACE AFTER
NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS**

by

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December 2016

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ENABLING PERSISTENT PEACE AFTER NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the theory and practice of sustaining peace after an intrastate conflict. After an agreed-upon peace settlement is signed, certain factors support sustaining the peace, and for this study those factors are analyzed to develop recommendations for implementation in Colombia. Drawing from literature on peace settlements and case studies, the thesis posits that the positive factors for sustainable peace be employed to function as a plan to deter a recurrence of intrastate conflict. The thesis tests these factors through analysis of the period following civil wars in Angola and Mozambique and finds that political inclusion and public security are particularly important. In Colombia, the Marines, along with the backing of the United States Armed Forces, will aim to sustain the peace through collaboration. Building on these findings, this thesis recommends ensuring that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reforms (SSR) are the foundations for sustaining the peace.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AUC	Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
CCPM	Joint Political and Military Commission
CGSB	Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar
CIVPOL	United Nations Civilian Police Component
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
ELN	Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army)
EPL	Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (Popular Liberation Army)
FAA	Angolan Armed Forces
FADM	Armed Forces of Mozambique
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FNLA	The National Liberation Front of Angola
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GDP	Gross domestic product
GNP	Gross national product
IDP	Internally displaced person
M-19	Movimiento 19 de Abril (April 19 Movement)
MONUA	United Nation Observer Mission Angola
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
SSR	Security sector reform
UN	United Nations
UNITA	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNOMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
U.S.	United States
USSR	The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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—Andres

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I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. foreign policy officials consider Plan Colombia to be one of the most successful foreign relations projects undertaken over the last 15 years. As the Colombian peace process hoped to end almost 50 years of internal conflict, negotiations continued in Cuba between the Government of Colombia and the nation's largest guerrilla group, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia). The current negotiations for achieving a peace settlement have been ongoing for almost four years, beginning in 2012 and reaching an initial agreement on August 26, 2016. Unfortunately, after a national referendum vote, the Colombian people did not ratify the initial agreement. In response, the Colombian government has included the opposing group, led by former President Uribe, to the current talks to attempt a final consensus. On November 12, 2016, all parties in the peace talks reached a finalized agreement for implementation. The United States and Colombia are optimistic about the eventual success of the peace talks. Nevertheless, the United States will continue to support the continuity of security gains that have been accomplished from Plan Colombia, in the event the agreement does not lead to peace. While most nations that experience intrastate conflict revert back to conflict, U.S. support strengthens the possibility of peace. During the conflict aftermath, the role of the Colombian Marines will be even more crucial, backed by U.S. Armed Forces, in supporting those factors that make a negotiated settlement into a lasting peace.

After the negotiated peace settlement, the security and stability of Colombia will not be automatic. It will require time and a sustained effort by the nation of Colombia. The security needs of Colombia are a prerequisite of a lasting peace. While the military and police forces will need to be ready and able to ensure stability; reforms will also be needed to reflect the changing environment. As the peace process has come to a close and a peace accord agreed upon, the military forces will be required to transition from active engagement in a bloody internal conflict to supporting the changing environment and maintaining the peace. During this period, though, the militaries' combat readiness must be maintained, if internal conflict persists.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

What are the factors for successful and failed transitions to peace after a negotiated settlement, and how can the Colombian Marines backed by the U.S. Armed Forces support civil authorities to sustain the peace and avoid the recurrence of intrastate conflict?

B. ARGUMENT

To end an intrastate conflict and achieve a durable peace, the parties involved can take one of two courses. Both entail an imbalance of power; that is, one party will be in a more dominant position. First, through a military victory, in which one of the sides, either the government or the rebels, defeats the other and assumes complete control over the government. In this option, the losing side must abide by the rules imposed on them by the victor. The defeated party does not have any option other than to comply, because if the defeated party acts counter to this, it could face complete annihilation.

Another way to end an intrastate conflict is through a negotiated peace settlement. Normally the negotiated settlement takes place after many years of war, since warring parties have not been able to defeat their counterpart. Following this course to peace, a government must consider many factors that can influence the outcome when choosing to end a conflict. Such factors include the duration of war, the number of deaths caused by acts of terrorism, and the magnitude of the destruction that terrorism has generated. When government officials and decision makers seek to end a conflict through a negotiated agreement with groups, including terrorists and insurgent organizations intent on harming citizens of their own nation, they must weigh these factors.

Typically, warring parties arrive at the negotiating table with the expectation of achieving more in the way of their own self-interests than was obtained through the outcome of the conflict. The expectation of the government is to maintain political or economic power, while rebel groups expect to gain legal access to the government in the hope of obtaining exclusive privileges, namely gaining control over certain segments of the population, territory, and government institutions. The timeframe for negotiations depends on the objectives warring parties want to achieve. The negotiations can last

months or even years, which is the case with Colombia. The Colombian government and the FARC have been negotiating for four years. However, the duration of time does not matter as much as the outcome. The final expectation for nations that have experienced intrastate conflict and chosen to end hostilities through negotiation is to achieve a lasting and sustainable peace.

Although a negotiated peace settlement can be difficult to achieve, it brings hope to a war-torn nation and can support the more difficult goal of achieving an enduring peace. The spirit of hope that arises when an agreement is reached can vanish quickly if expectations are not met when the agreement is implemented. During the implementation process, parties to the agreement may begin to lose motivation when they realize the difficulties that must be overcome to realize the goals of the agreement. Over time, the interests of the conflicting groups may surface and cause a breach in the agreement, motivating the parties to return to war. However, extra effort has to be put forth by former warring parties to remain committed to maintaining peace. In particular, the government in the conflict aftermath must work hard to reduce the factors that influenced the onset of hostilities.

The same factors that initiated the onset of conflict, if not rectified, have the potential to persist and lead to another outbreak of hostilities. We found that such factors commonly include political exclusion, ethnic fragmentation, economic grievances, greed, and weakness of the state, which are widely known to trigger civil wars and their recurrence. To ensure that peace prevails after a negotiated settlement, the parties involved in the negotiations must be required to achieve a durable peace. It is important to note that the most successful transitions to peace are those that do not depend on a third party, but rather on commitments between previous enemies. For example, commitments made by the government must be kept. Therefore, if the government chooses to use the armed forces to protect ex-combatants who give up their arms and place their trust in the government, the government must provide them with that security.

The promise of protecting ex-combatants is one of the most difficult for the military during the implementation of the agreements. The government must foster an environment in which demobilized ex-combatants will no longer have nor need their

weapons for self-protection. Thus, demobilized ex-combatants must feel the negotiated agreement between the government and former rebel leaders delivers on a fundamental aspect of trust, thereby demonstrating the ability of the government to achieve its constitutional obligation to provide adequate protection. Trust between the parties is a long and fragile process, but it is a key element to sustain the peace.

After Colombia has agreed to a negotiated settlement with the FARC, there is much speculation over the future role of the Armed Forces during the post-conflict era. Some people insist on the need to reduce the size of the Armed Forces, including the Colombian Marines. Likewise, with the possible reduction in force size, there could be a decrease in operational budgets. The argument justifying these cuts is that Colombia will no longer be plagued by an armed insurgency. The argument is invalid when considering the security environment in Colombia; the FARC is not the only illegal armed group committing atrocities.

The transition to a post-conflict society does not mean an immediate role change for the Marines or for the support that the Marines provide to the National Police. The Marines need to continue to supplement the Colombian National Police, especially in rural and poorer areas remote from the principle urban centers. Another effort after the peace deal is agreed upon will be for the Marines to support the Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR) process by securing FARC assembly areas and preparing to fight a possible recurrence of hostilities by armed groups seeking to overthrow the government. The Colombian Marines cannot give up the capabilities to face an unconventional enemy, under the assumption internal threats will no longer exist. Many skills that have been acquired through fighting an unconventional war by the Colombian Marines over many years of internal conflict. In any scenario, the state and the Colombian people will continue to need the Armed Forces, not only to defend the territory but to ensure the country's economic development, by safeguarding the democracy and protecting natural resources. A secure environment is necessary for political and economic wellbeing in Colombia's post-conflict era.

The United States will be a guarantor of peace in Colombia by monitoring the progress towards implementing the peace accords and ensuring the factors that initially

led to unrest and conflict are addressed. Since Colombia is a major security partner in the western hemisphere and benefactor of successful foreign policy by the United States over the last 15 years. The security of the nation can be accomplished by continuing the policies from Plan Colombia; however, the armed forces must evolve to meet new challenges that lay ahead. The U.S. military should support Colombia with foreign aid, credit to purchase up-to-date weaponry, and send U.S. personnel to advise and assist in reconstruction efforts. For a sustainable peace to take hold, the U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) working as an interagency command, should conduct a full assessment in conjunction with the American Embassy in Bogota, and the USMILGROUP collaboratively with the Colombian Ministry of Defense to determine all possible support to transition from conflict to peace. With support from the United States, Colombia's security institutions—the Armed Forces and the National Police—must transform to meet the needs of the new environment. By continuing to ensure a strong security environment, the government ensures that the political and economic wellbeing of the nation can be achieved in Colombia's post-conflict era.

C. BACKGROUND

In order to determine the factors related to a durable peace and how the Colombian Marines and U.S. Military can support those factors, this thesis examines the theory and practice of the persistence of peace, primarily after a negotiated settlement. We accomplished this by reviewing current literature on sustaining peace after negotiated settlements and case studies demonstrating a successful and a failed attempt at the non-recurrence in conflict. The integration of case study analysis and current literature on sustaining peace sheds light on the outcomes of non-recurrence of internal conflict after a negotiated peace process. This provides clearer insight into the outcomes of selected case studies as a means to predict similar circumstances in the future post-peace process in Colombia.

When the current peace negotiations between the Colombian Government and the FARC began in November 2012, the Colombian Government was looking at “the end of more than 50 years of conflict in Colombia,” according to statements by Colombian

President Juan Manuel Santos.¹ According to scholars such as Quackenbush, Hirotaka, Call, Hartzell, Doyle, Sambanis, and Walter, who have addressed the issue of how to end an internal conflict, as with any nation, Colombia would have two basic ways to end its internal conflict. The first is through military victory, either by the sovereign nation's government or by a rebel group. The second is a negotiated peace agreement between the parties in conflict. In the case of Colombia, the more preferred solution would be through a negotiated settlement. In Havana, Cuba, the Colombian Government and the FARC are continuing peace talks even after a national referendum voted against the initial settlement. Therefore, one of the objectives of this work is to study more deeply the theories behind the negotiated settlement and their application to the Colombian scenario, to foresee a durable peace or the possibility for the recurrence of conflict.

Barbara Walter, Professor of Political Science at UC San Diego and an expert on International Security with an emphasis on civil war, demonstrated the first pattern of recurrence of conflict by stating:

Some data suggests that internal conflicts have a surprisingly high recidivism rate of the 103 countries that experienced some form of internal conflict between 1991–2009, from minor to major conflict, only 44 avoided a subsequent return to internal conflict. That means that 56 percent of all countries that suffered from one internal conflict during this period experienced at least one conflict thereafter.²

Walter's study underscores the importance of studying those nations that have not had a recurrence of internal conflict and could support the exploration of potential conditions derived from her analysis.

When peace follows a military victory, it is more durable because the winning side can establish the rules and conditions for the subsequent peace. The defeated side cannot impose anything, because it is not strong enough to do so, and must conform to the measures imposed by the winning side. When peace is achieved through a negotiated

¹ “Cronología del Proceso de Paz entre el Gobierno y las FARC,” [chronology of the peace process between the Government and the FARC] Revista Semana, September 23, 2015, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/linea-de-tiempo-del-proceso-de-paz-de-las-farc-gobierno/443570-3>

² Barbara Walter, “Conflict Relapse and the Sustainability of Post-conflict Peace,” The World Bank, September 13, 2010, 1, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/128031468182669586/pdf/620260WP0Confl0BOX0361475B00PUBLIC0.pdf>

settlement, the situation is different. Theories claim that the probability of returning to conflict after such agreements is very high.

After a negotiated settlement, different causes can generate the recurrence of conflict, and Mason, Walter, Brandt, and Quinn have devoted themselves to studying those causes and factors. Among the possible causes, we find that initially what leads to an internal conflict persists after reaching a negotiated settlement. In the event either party fails to comply with the agreements, especially on the issue of power sharing, recurrence of conflict is high. Another cause arises from inadequate security for former rebel forces. Often they do not find an environment that supports their transition to lawful activities, whether political or economic. Last, a motivating objective of our work is to gain a better understanding of those factors that lead to the recurrence of internal conflict after a negotiated settlement and how to avoid those circumstances.

Our examination of the Angola civil war case study assesses the measures taken to avoid the recurrence of internal conflict after a negotiated peace settlement. We have found Angola is a success story for persistent peace after a negotiated settlement when the government holds a majority of the power. Additionally, an examination of Mozambique's civil war is a case study to assess the failures that occurred after a negotiated settlement and more than 20 years of relative peace. Presumably, the cases of Angola and Mozambique have similarities to Colombia's experience, demonstrating the effect of limited and unrestricted involvement from the international community.

The integrated approach using Angola and Mozambique as case studies and game theory proved useful in this study. The security sector reform (SSR) institutions defined for the purposes of this study are the military and police forces. Many nations do not know the role their host nation militaries' should take following a negotiated peace settlement. For this reason, our findings develop a framework for implementation by these militaries.

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Multiple studies consider the causes of and measures taken to avoid the recurrence of civil war. The research for this literature review identified two main

transitional processes resulting in the termination of internal conflict. The principal one is civil wars ending in a military victory, and the other is the more complicated process associated with a negotiated settlement in the absence of a clear military victory. During the course of this literature review, we reveal the current theories behind these two processes and case studies. One case demonstrates a positive outcome of non-renewal of hostilities in one nation, and the other focuses on renewed hostilities after two decades of peace. In Colombia, there are multiple examples of attempts at moving forward with a negotiated settlement, which could have led to a potentially successful transition to peace over the last 30 years. The theory used in this review focuses on identifying factors for a successful transition from conflict to achieving a durable peace.

1. Ending Civil Wars

The theoretical argument for ending civil wars has consistently shown that when a victor imposes its will, the result is a more stable security environment than in a negotiated peace settlement.³ The victors from military action are likely to be fulfilled with the post-settlement status quo, and the losers are less likely (being too weak after outright defeat) to challenge the new state of affairs by initiating another conflict. Furthermore, there is much less likelihood of a power-sharing relationship under an imposed settlement, when the victor ensures that defeated party's ability to renew the conflict is diminished. Considering this, the theoretical basis and evidence supports the stability of imposed settlements, rather than other types.⁴ The two different processes for preventing the recurrence of civil war are emphasized by their definitions: “**military victory** is a war termination in which one side defeats or eliminates the other side.”⁵ When there is a military victory, the conqueror destroys the capability of the loser and denies the defeated party the use of arms, making it possible to prevent the loser from re-initiating a civil war. The author of the definition argues that military victory is more

³ Stephen Quackenbush and Jerome Venteicher, “Settlements, Outcomes, and the Recurrence of Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 6 (November 2008): 725.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Hirotaka Ohmura, “Termination and Recurrence of Civil War: Which Outcomes Lead to Durable Peace after Civil War?,” *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 12, no 3 (December 2011): 376, doi: 10.1017/S146810991100017X. Emphasis added.

likely to lead to stable peace than a negotiated peace settlement, because through victory the balance of power becomes imbalanced between the parties involved.⁶

The principal process related to our research question is the prevention of internal conflict recurrence through **peace negotiation**, a process that is presently under way between the Colombian Government and FARC. This process is defined as a “**negotiated peace settlement** in a war termination, in which the government and rebel group(s) agree to stop fighting and resolve the issue of civil war, and adopt a comprehensive formal treaty on the form of government and post-war recovery.”⁷ This process ends in failure when there is a lack of genuine commitment by the disadvantaged party abiding by the agreement and increases the likelihood of peace settlement failure. This hypothesis suggests that the failure of peace settlement implementation results from the combatants’ inability to provide a credible commitment to uphold the agreement. This lack of commitment may be attributed to structural features such as quasi anarchy, which means that “no central government exists to ensure implementation of order or law.”⁸ Next, peace agreements require a rebel group to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) into society, while the nation has to look at SSR or the evolving nature of the security environment. This is accomplished by making the necessary changes in a post-conflict environment to ensure the state’s security apparatus is meeting new challenges.

According to Walter, “those states that are willing to resolve key rebel grievances are believed to have an increased expectation of avoiding renewed violence rather than those governments that leave important issues unresolved.”⁹ Once the primary motivation for inspiring a rebel movement has diminished, the group should disintegrate, effectively ending the conflict.

⁶ Ibid., 378.

⁷ Ibid., 376. Emphasis added.

⁸ Ibid., 379.

⁹ Barbara Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Recurring Civil War,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (May 2004): 373.
<http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/213133021?accountid=12702>.

2. Peace Preservation in a Post-Negotiated Settlement

This section will better define how to preserve the peace after the completion of a negotiated settlement. The following sections include power sharing, peacekeeping, and economic development.

a. Power Sharing

A major factor in resolving the issues that a rebel organization may have in peace negotiations is to establish an agreement of power sharing as a system of governance in which the rebel parties involved in the conflict are granted a role.¹⁰ This can be accomplished through allocated offices in the state for participation in administrative, elected, or appointed positions. The intention is to remedy discriminatory actions and listen to the rebel groups' needs for recognition as being distinct with a right for guaranteed representation, legislative votes, and possibly territorial devolution.¹¹ The need for power sharing is expressed by the statement that, "Agreements that preserve adversaries' organizations and call for them to share power will stabilize the peace by providing rivals with a stake in the state and by making it difficult for opponents to use force to alter war-ending bargains."¹²

Caroline Hartzell, a professor in the Department of Political Science at Gettysburg College, and Matthew Hoddie, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Towson University, hypothesize that

the adoption of power-sharing measures by rival factions can help to extend the peace, and argue that these provisions can be used to stabilize expectations and reduce uncertainty. When adversaries agree to share power, this action can prolong the peace by providing rival groups a stake in their own future. The rationalist approach to war recognizes that actors' preferences are not indefinite and if or when rebel groups' expectations

¹⁰ Charles Call, *Why Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2012), 40.

¹¹ Karl DeRouen, Jenna Lea, and Peter Wallensteen, "The Duration of Civil War Peace Agreements," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 4 (September 2009): 368.

¹² Caroline Hartzell, "Settling Civil Wars Armed Opponents' Fates and the Duration of the Peace," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 4 (September 2009): 348.

change, a settlement can become void and then challenged, including through a renewed use of force.¹³

According to Professor Karl DeRouen, Director of the International Studies program at the University of Alabama, Jenna Lea, Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, and Peter Wallensteen, Senior Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Sweden's Uppsala University, observe:

Another form of power sharing is through integrating ex-combatants into the military; this contributes to peace through two primary mechanisms. First, it can reinforce trust between the belligerent party and the government by countering the concern for the need of increased self-defense, and lowering the chance military forces will be used against them. Second, military integration offers economic stability by providing employment to the rebels.¹⁴

b. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations

Hartzell has shown that scholars have suggested that introducing peacekeeping forces in the post conflict period should help to assure an enduring peace. The promise of a third party to provide safety and security to former combatants should serve to reassure them and increase their commitment to peace.¹⁵

The literature has made it clear that intervention by the international community can help to sustain peace. The mere presence of peacekeeping forces is not an end-all be-all solution, of course. There is no solution that guarantees peace, but it does support the outcome. The efforts of international actors to support conflict-ridden states in avoiding a recurrence of armed conflict are well worth the purpose for using them.¹⁶

Peacebuilding is a phase that occurs after a peace agreement has been negotiated to address current hostilities and build capabilities for conflict resolution. The intent

¹³ Ibid., 350.

¹⁴ DeRouen, Lea, and Wallensteen, "The Duration of Civil War Peace," 369.

¹⁵ Hartzell, "Settling Civil Wars," 355.

¹⁶ Virginia Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (May 2004): 288.

behind peacebuilding is to facilitate the social, economic, and political revitalization of institutions and attitudes that will prevent post-conflict hostilities from being reignited.¹⁷

c. Economic Development

The economic environment in a post-conflict nation requires reforms to be enacted to stimulate economic growth and the interjection of timely international aid to avoid the relapse in hostilities. There is no clear solution to fix the ills of post-conflict economies in a short period; however, good economic policies have the opportunity to diminish the risk of recurrence. According to Paul Collier, from the Department of Economics, Oxford University, and Co-Director for the Centre for the Study of African Economies, “Economic strategy can only complement other strategies for keeping the post-conflict peace.”¹⁸ Collier advocates for a dual strategy relying on economic and political reforms and suggests technical expertise tends to focus more on political rather than economic solutions due to the type of individuals commonly writing the policies.

For countries that end their civil wars, the potential growth rate can be very high and during the decade following a conflict, external forces should maintain the peace, while pursuing economic recovery policies. Collier further argues, “the most common policy error of post-conflict governments is to maintain military spending around conflict levels.”¹⁹ A reduction in military spending can reduce the risk of further conflict and the resources utilized to benefit those economic policies, unless there are additional internal rebel groups that wish to overthrow the government. In the case of Colombia, the economy has the potential to benefit from peace with the FARC; however, other insurgent groups still threaten internal security.

The priority for policy reforms in most post-conflict nations includes reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, integration of the rural economy into national markets, and enforcement of property rights. The post-conflict period is a time to build

¹⁷ Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,” *American Political Science Review* 94, no. 4 (December 2000): 779.

¹⁸ Paul Collier, “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery,” Department of Economics Oxford University, April 2006, <http://users.ox.ac.uk/~econpco/research/pdfs/IPA-PostConflictEconomicRecovery.pdf>

¹⁹ Collier, “Post-Conflict Economic Recovery,” 4

strong ethical business practices between public/private partnerships, which can be developed to enforce contract law and develop accountability among public entities. If strong accountability and ethical practices are cultivated early on, then a patronage system will have less ability to develop.

3. The Factors Leading to a Renewed Outbreak of Civil War

Chapter II describes the negative factors that have inevitably led to the recurrence of internal conflict. Different scholars have been studying the factors that influence parties involved in a civil war or internal war. There are seven factors. First among them is political exclusion, which Call argues, “Plays the decisive role in most cases of civil war recurrence: political exclusion acts as a trigger for renewed armed conflict.”²⁰ The second is coercion. According to Sara Zukerman, “the State Coercion, caused disparate, apolitical organizations to form broad coalitions, radicalize and eventually endorse the armed alternative, providing fuel to war.”²¹ Ethnic discrimination is the third factor. According to Mehmet Gurses and Nicolas Rost, “Discrimination against an ethnic group whose members have been involved in a civil war against the government is an important factor in influencing the risk of war recurrence.”²² The fourth factor is economic grievances, which David Mason argues is “where more people suffer from deeper levels of poverty, [and] grievances are likely to be more widespread and more deeply felt, and it is in such environments that civil wars are most likely to occur.”²³ Weak states are the fifth factor. Walter argues, “Civil war tends to make poor countries poorer and weak states weaker, encouraging additional wars over time.”²⁴ Sixth is greed. Collier argues that “the war becomes a fairly lucrative business where those who have arms control the economic resources of a country. Where rebel organizations are financially and militarily

²⁰ Call. *Why Peace Fails*, 4.

²¹ Daly Zukerman, “The Roots of Coercion and Insurgency: Exploiting the Counterfactual Case of Honduras,” *Conflict, Security & Development* 11, no. 2 (May 2011): 147.

²² Mehmet Gurses and Nicolas Rost, “Sustaining the Peace After Ethnic Civil Wars,” *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30, no. 5 (November 2013): 485.

²³ David Mason and U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, *Sustaining the Peace After Civil War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 9.

²⁴ Barbara Walter, “Why Bad Governance Leads to Repeat Civil War,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 59, no. 7 (2015): 2.

feasible, rebellions are likely to emerge, promoting whatever political agenda their leaders happen to support.”²⁵ Finally, destruction from the previous civil war is a factor. According to Hartzell, “The wounds of civil war may be irremediable, damage to infrastructure may be irreparable, the cost of state recovery can be high, and recurrence in war surely be inevitable.”²⁶

E. CASE STUDIES

The following case studies of Angola and Mozambique were chosen based on their similarly historical conditions to those of Colombia. Angola and Mozambique were colonized by Europeans from the Iberian Peninsula, and after winning their independence from Portugal, they were divided nations presented with a power struggle for political and economic governance. Their intrastate conflicts were influenced by international actors as proxy wars during the Cold War. We analyzed Angola’s civil war and experience with transitioning to peace to assess the positive factors that prevented the recurrence of internal conflict after a negotiated peace settlement. Mozambique’s civil war transition to peace and subsequent recurrence to hostilities provided insight into the negative factors leading to renewed conflict. The initial analysis of Angola and Mozambique demonstrate lessons learned that can inform Colombia as it moves through the process towards peace and avoidance of renewed conflict.

1. Angola

Chapter III is a case study analysis of Angola’s transition to peace after ending conflict with a negotiated peace settlement and achieving a successful non-recurrence in hostilities. The rebel opposition group Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was weakened by government forces, concluding in a military victory. The end of the Angolan intrastate conflict led to a negotiated settlement and a durable peace. After almost 27 years of intrastate war, the culmination was a peace accord known as the

²⁵ Paul Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” *Foreign Policy* 136, (May/June 2003): 42.
<http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/224045294?accountid=12702>

²⁶ Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild. “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War: An Investigation of Some Key Variables,” *International Organization* 55, no. 01 (2001): p. 198.

“Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” signed in April 2002, which supplemented the failed 1994 Lusaka Protocol.²⁷ The memorandum became a promise between the two sides that they would end the hostilities and restore peace. Earlier ceasefires in the 1980s and 1990s failed, but this peace agreement has been in effect for almost 14 years.

The rebel leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, was killed in a military operation by the Angolan forces, which also destroyed the group’s headquarters and dozens of top rebel leaders. The negotiated peace deal between the Angolan Government and rebel group called for the demobilization of 50,000 fighters, amnesty for the combatants who committed crimes, and for newly held elections to determine political representation. There were also third-party brokers helping to oversee the deal in a joint military commission, represented by officials from Russia, the United States, and Portugal, which helped monitor the ceasefire and peace deal.

The Angolan civil war was one of the proxy wars of the Cold War, where the Soviet Union and Cuban troops supported Marxist independence, and Western nations and South Africa supported the rebel group until its tactics became too brutal. The United States supported the organization until the end of the Cold War. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Angolan Government slowly distanced itself from the Marxist approach to governance, and UNITA’s cause seemed to be futile. The state of Angola today is characterized by extremes in economic stratification, though the nation is rich in natural resources. A major portion of the population has not yet seen the benefits of the peace accord; however, it has been successful at sustaining the peace.

2. Mozambique

Chapter IV is a case study analysis demonstrating a nation that ended its civil war with a negotiated peace settlement, but reverted to hostilities after two decades of relative peace. Mozambique was embroiled in war for most of the period of 1965 to 1992. Although Mozambique had become a Cold War battlefield, in October 4, 1992, a peace accord was signed in Rome between the government of Mozambique (FRELIMO) and

²⁷ “Military Reform: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed November 1, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-luena-memorandum-understanding>.

the RENAMO. With an enduring peace that lasted almost 20 years and with a GDP growth rate of more than 8 percent per year, Mozambique was the prototype of a success story.²⁸ The problem was that this growth was concentrated in the south of the country and especially in the capital, Maputo.²⁹ Besides the economic inequality, corruption and political violence continued to engulf the state. Tensions between the two main opponents, FRELIMO and RENAMO, have weakened the country's stability and clashes have once again been renewed.

F. COLOMBIA

Chapter V is a discussion of the Colombia's past failed attempts at achieving peace. Since 1948, beginning with the death of a Colombian presidential candidate, Jorge Eliécer Gaitán Ayala, the country has suffered constant internal conflict. Many waves of violence have erupted based on an array of different "root causes." The organizations taking part in the violence have run the gamut, from guerrilla groups or terrorist organizations to self-defense paramilitary groups, drug cartels, and other illicit organizations. The most notorious of these are liberal guerrilla organizations such as the FARC, Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (ELN), Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL), and Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19). These organizations have generated an environment of hopelessness in Colombia.

Since 1948, almost all Colombian presidents have tried to reach a peace agreement with these groups. One of the most notorious peace talk failures in Colombia's history has been the peace talk between President Andres Pastrana and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia).

President Andrés Pastrana was elected in 1998 and according to Kilcullen and Mills, he started with the pursuit of peace talks, creating a demilitarized zone centered on San Vicente del Caguan, including a "peace camp" at Las Pozos. However, he suspended the talks in February of 2002, after the guerrillas demonstrated they were no longer

²⁸ Joseph Hanlon, "Bringing It All Together: A Case Study of Mozambique," in *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 273.

²⁹ Ibid. 281.

willing to surrender.³⁰ FARC essentially followed the tactic discussed earlier, “to rearm, resupply, and reengage” in the fight outside the demilitarized zone, exploiting the peace negotiation to the fullest to gain momentum by using Caguan as a vantage point to massively expand cocaine production and attack Colombian cities.³¹

The current Colombian President, Juan Manuel Santos, wants peace. His arguments are mainly based on the length of the protracted war in Colombia, almost 50 years since the date he took office in 2010, and the magnitude of the damage that the war has caused throughout all this time. Despite the military successes of recent years and the decline in the strategy of the FARC, this homegrown terrorist group continues to be financed by the drug trade. If an end to the conflict is not achieved, it is certain to continue the same vicious cycle of war for many more years in Colombia.

In Chapter VI, a game theoretic analysis helps determine whether it is best for the interests of each side to abide by the negotiated settlement or if reverting to war is the best option. Last, the concluding chapter of this thesis reinforces what has been learned during the course of this study and offers recommendations for the implementation of the negotiated peace agreement to achieve a lasting peace.

³⁰ David, Kilcullen and Greg Mills, “Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace.” *PRISM* 5, no 3 (2015): 111.

³¹ Ibid.

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II. UNSTABLE PEACE: NEGATIVE FACTORS RELATED WITH THE RECURRENCE OF WAR

The relapse to civil war has become a continuous concern for those countries that have achieved peace through a negotiated settlement. The perfect result from such an agreement would be a stable and lasting peace. However, a negotiated settlement does not mean that a nation's problems disappear the day after the settlement has been ratified. On the contrary, most of the problems that led to a civil war still persist, and in some cases become even worse, creating a suitable environment for new forms of violence. David Mason, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, explains the recurrence of war using a medical analogy: "A nation that has had one civil war is like a person who has had a heart attack. That person is more likely to have another heart attack than are others who share the same risk factors but have so far not had their first heart attack."³² Thus, the factors that generated the outbreak of war can still persist and motivate a renewal of war.

Scholars have been studying the factors that influence or have influenced parties involved in a negotiated settlement to return to civil war. Among these factors are: 1) political exclusion, 2) coercion, 3) ethnic discrimination, 4) economic grievances, 5) weak states, 6) greed, and 7) destruction from the previous civil war. The purpose of this chapter is to explain these factors and how they can promote the recurrence of war after a negotiated settlement. Significantly, the recurrence of war can involve one or a mixture of these factors.

A. POLITICAL EXCLUSION

Having the right of to elect and to be elected to office is fundamental to every human being, regardless of their social status, gender, or race. However, sometimes these civil liberties are not respected, and the right to participate in politics and in the decision making of a country is restricted. This restriction is called political exclusion. Political

³² David Mason and U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, *Sustaining the Peace After Civil War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2007), 42.

exclusion occurs when differences exist between segments of a population, differences of ethnicity, economic status, and political power, among others. Segments of the population tend to monopolize the benefits generated by political power, therefore, restricting the participation of those less favored to receive the same political benefits. Thus, the excluded segment is restrained from any involvement in the government or participation in the institutions that may exist in that government.

Political exclusion, according to Melissa Williams, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, and Stephen Macedo, Director of the University Center for Human Values at Princeton, “consists in being shut out of the rights and privileges of membership in a community or association. More specifically political exclusion entails being in denial of some or all of the formal rights of citizenship, or having no effective access to participation in political decision making or both.”³³ Generally, when a segment is excluded and has used all means available to obtain political inclusion, this segment may use weapons to gain or regain political rights that have been denied or restricted to them as citizens. The government or those with political power to keep their political benefits may use weapons against the excluded. Thus, political exclusion can be a factor contributing to the start of a civil war.

After a civil war, commitments are established in a negotiated settlement to facilitate those excluded segments to recover the rights that were denied to them. These commitments include guarantees of and better conditions in which to participate politically. Methods of popular election become more participatory and allow a more meaningful representation of those segments previously discriminated against. If these reforms occur in a transparent way and a democratic electoral process evolves to include all the political parties and populations of a country, there is no reason for allegations of political exclusion. However, if reforms do not occur and political rights are not improved, settlements can fail and a relapse into war may be inevitable.

After a negotiated agreement, parties without previous political rights usually, have the expectation of being fully included in the new political process of rebuilding the

³³ Stephen Macedo, and Melissa Williams, introduction, in *Political Exclusion and Domination*, ed. Melissa S. Williams and Stephen Macedo (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 3.

nation. However, parties that possess greater political powers may have developed a sense of entitlement to more freedom when deciding to violate agreements. This often leads to a return to the previous stage of the settlement process; once again generating more resentment on the part of those who are disadvantaged. In fact, the mere perception of being discriminated against can be just as detrimental as actually experiencing discrimination or exclusion. Therefore, when one of the negotiating parties does not realize its political expectations in the post-conflict period, that party is likely to feel it has no choice but to return to war. Charles Call, Associate Professor of International Peace and Conflict Resolution at the American University, reaffirms this pattern, saying: “Political exclusion plays the decisive role in civil war recurrence: political exclusion acts as a trigger for renewed hostilities.”³⁴ Moreover, any side that feels deprived of their political rights in the post-conflict period will return to their previous practices to regain political inclusion.

In a post-conflict situation, the institutions that embody the state must then be sure to represent the population equally in order to avoid the recurrence of war. There cannot be any segments of a population that feel they are being excluded; methods of political participation should be equitable for all citizens of a state. In this way, political inclusion is necessary to reduce the risk of returning to war, and it becomes a way in which ideas and opinions of the previously excluded segments are taken into account. Additionally, political inclusion can serve as a form of checks and balances, from one segment to another, and preventing the excesses of power and sharing the benefits equitably among all. Each population segment, no matter how small, must have representation in institutions of the government. Where political differences or divisions exist, debate should be the only option to resolve these differences between various segments of the population within a country.

B. COERCION

Those who have been threatened or coerced to fulfill the will of others will likely seek to defend themselves. Patrick Garrity, a research faculty affiliate with the Miller

³⁴ Charles Call, *Why Peace Fails*, 4.

Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, has written an article on this topic with Shmuel Bar, Director of Studies at the Institute of Policy and Strategy in Herzliya, Israel; and Keith B. Payne, President of the National Institute for Public Policy and Professor and department head at the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri. In their article, “Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors,” they define coercion as, “Methods, including the use of force, to compel an adversary to change behavior—to cease or undo an action that has already been taken, or to cause those to take action they would not be inclined to take without the threat or use of force.”³⁵ However, coercion sometimes gets the opposite result. Those who decide to use coercion resort to the use of force or the use of violence to reduce the pressure over them, resulting in a war.

Disarmament of the warring parties, usually just the insurgents, is one of the main objectives to be resolved during a peace agreement. The submission of weapons through the disarmament process may involve one or both parties in the conflict, depending on how the conflict has ended. In this respect, after they complete the turn-in of their weapons, the rebels are in a state of total vulnerability. Hirotaka Ohmura, Professor of International and Intrastate Conflict at Shiga University in Japan, explains this vulnerability: “Peace agreement requires a rebel group to disarm and demobilize, and such a requirement makes the rebel group more vulnerable to surprise military attacks and coercion than before.”³⁶ Once the rebels have laid down their arms, the state must be committed to ensuring their safety, since in the past the weapons had guaranteed their survival. As soon as the rebels turn in their weapons, the government needs to provide protection to those who were formerly its attackers.

The latter situation is a bit complicated and even more so when the wounds of war have not fully healed. In this context, if a government decides to violate the agreements and use its weapons to recover those benefits lost during the negotiations or extend the

³⁵ Keith Payne, Deterrence and Coercion of Non-State Actors: Analysis of Case Studies (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, 2008), 3. <http://www.nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Summary-Report-of-Deterrence-and-Non-State-Actors.pdf>

³⁶ Ohmura, “Termination and Recurrence of Civil War,” 379.

gains of those negotiations by using coercion, the recurrence of war is imminent. Therefore, trust is a vital element for the combatants for reassurance of their security by turning in their weapons. The former combatants must be assured that their safety and survival will be guaranteed after a negotiated agreement.

Coercion can also be used against the general population. Government entities or rebels who control a territory are a potential menace as they toy with the use of force or retaliation to achieve political ends. Elections present the opportunity for those who have weapons to put pressure on voters to achieve favorable political outcomes. These types of political results generate dissatisfaction, which usually leads to protest and often times can incite government repression. The use of coercion to achieve political victories makes the elected officials look legitimate, thereby threatening the durability of peace. Consequently, fears of repression that were a reason to start a war can reappear in the new phase after the conflict, when weapons were hidden..

C. ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION

Ethnic differences can persist in the post-conflict stage, after a negotiated settlement, making any peace tentative. Ethnic discrimination has led to more deaths during civil wars than any other factor since the end of the Second World War. Wars in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Guatemala were marked by this factor. A salient feature of this factor is an “us vs. them” mentality. Warring parties may exploit the period of conflict, when there is a state of total dehumanization, to commit atrocities. Ethnic discrimination, though, is not just about the murder of one group by another or of a minority by majority. It can also mean denying the most basic services that a state must provide, such as security, health, and education, among others, to a certain group of the population, because they may be considered by the state as part of another class or of another social status.

Ethnic discrimination is explained by Mason, in his book *Sustaining the Peace after Civil War*. According to Mason, it is “Those who are not members of the group favored by the state withhold their support from the state, either tacitly by neglecting to comply with state laws and regulations and evading taxes, or actively by organizing

opposition movements to challenge the incumbent regime.”³⁷ Due to the marginalization suffered, targeted groups instigate protests and demonstrations in order to demand the recognition of their rights. It is usual that the initial reaction of government is to ignore the appeals of the marginalized, a situation that leads those protesting to make use of violence seeking greater government attention. With the presence of violence, the government is expected to use the same method—violence—to suppress the protestors. The latter situation makes the marginalized group increase the use of violence in order to obtain their rights, which have been denied, widening the gap between the government and the marginalized.

The differences between ethnic groups may be even more difficult to solve than the other factor described in this chapter and it could be very possible that a combatant group prefers the total annihilation of the counterpart before having to sit down and talk with them. Mason and Jason Quinn, Research Assistant Professor of Political Science at Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame, in their article “Sustaining Peace: Stopping the Recurrence of Civil Wars,” state: “Ethnic civil wars are less likely to be brought to an end through a negotiation.”³⁸ The ethnic differences complicate the ability of opposing ethnic groups to empathize with one another to come to a consensus. However, when a negotiated settlement is achieved, the post-conflict process is even more complicated and monumental efforts of reconciliation need to be made to achieve a sustainable peace. Call in his book, *Why Peace Failed*, suggests: “When there is a history of inequity between ethnic social groups, it complicates the process of democratization and peacebuilding after a conflict.”³⁹ Thus, when ethnic discrimination occurs, such as in Rwanda, the chances of recurrence in war are high. Despite the agreements and possible achievement of peace, ethnic differences will persist in the post-war period, and those differences easily can initiate a conflict.

³⁷ Mason, *Sustaining the Peace After Civil War*, 11.

³⁸ David Mason and Jason Quinn, “Sustaining the Peace: Stopping the Recurrence of Civil Wars,” in *Conflict Preventing and Peacebuilding in Post-war Societies*, ed. David Mason and James Meernik (New York: Routledge, 2006), 21.

³⁹ Call, *Why Peace Fails*, 65.

Ethnic discrimination has to be halted during the post-conflict period. It is difficult for peace to continue in an environment of persistent ethnic discrimination, and any act could be considered an act of racism or exclusion. The uncertainty of whether the government will comply with the terms of a negotiated settlement will always be present, and therefore, the use of weapons will be the most sought after option to make the government comply.

D. ECONOMIC GRIEVANCES

Scholars consider the economic dimensions as among the most important factors affecting the onset and recurrence of civil war. Economic factors are related mainly to the living conditions of the population, their personal incomes, the level of education and opportunities to which they have access, health care systems, and any possible benefits they are eligible to receive from the government, among others. When the resources of a nation are distributed among a few, a monopoly of wealth occurs, and a small number of elites realize the economic benefits. Thus, those among the population that do not receive enough economic benefits find reasons to challenge the government. Walter, in her article “Conflict Begets Conflict,” argues, “Misery or quality of life is a critical factor for onset and the recurrence in war.”⁴⁰ Frequently, terrorist groups or rebels tap economic motivators to gain the public’s support for their causes, using the argument that they are fighting for those denied or nonexistent economic rights. In this regard, rebels and terrorist organizations find that better financial opportunities come through illicit activities such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, kidnapping and others. Frequently, illicit organizations use the money earned to recruit future fighters with the promise of higher wages. Indeed, those wages are higher than legally sanctioned activities could provide.

Generally, during the peace agreements or negotiated settlements one of the main goals is to reduce the complaints that some communities have about their lack of access to the economic benefits of their nation. Thus, during the negotiated settlement and the post-conflict period, an equitable economic distribution is needed to avoid the previous

⁴⁰ Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict? 383.

economic imbalance. Nevertheless, the economic problems faced by countries after a civil war are numerous, and those countries cannot expect to have enormous amounts of funds available overnight, even less so, the money available to distribute directly to the population. The results of war usually have worn down the domestic economy of a country and during such conflicts governments have invested their fiscal resources principally in fighting rebel groups dedicated to violent acts. The efforts that governments must make toward economic recovery are substantial and complicated. Paul Collier suggests the importance of this economic recovery: “Poor countries that are not developing but have so far escaped civil war are also racing against time. If they do not find ways to accelerate their economic growth and development, they will likely stumble into conflict.”⁴¹ Hence, when efforts to improve the economy have failed to reduce existing needs, the population’s disappointment persists, and those dissatisfied segments of the population push for the recurrence of war. Evidently, to reduce the possible recurrence of war the state must work to improve the quality of life of its citizens. This is a fundamental premise that includes healthcare, education, the right to work, public security, and among others.

The post-conflict period is an excellent time for a government to reverse the negative effects of war. Anything that slows the growth and development of a nation can weaken democracy, increase inequality, injustice, and dissatisfaction in a society. For that reason, the economy must be strengthened to ensure the welfare of future generations. A better level of economic development would give more legitimacy to the government. Walter, in her article “Does Conflict Beget Conflict,” maintains, “Governments that are willing to address and settle key rebel grievances are believed to have a higher chance of avoiding renewed violence than governments that leave important issues unanswered.”⁴² The demands, difficulties, beliefs, and opinions and, of course, the economic status of each individual are different, and consequently, the ability to meet their basic needs varies. When individuals cannot meet those needs, they may be inclined to participate in violent conflict to seek equality.

⁴¹ Collier, “The Market for Civil War,” 42.

⁴² Walter, “Does Conflict Beget Conflict?”, 373.

E. WEAK STATES

“Weak states” refers to the inability of the government to exercise effective presence through its institutions over all geographic realms residing within the sovereign borders of a country. This absence of effective presence of the state means a failure in the provision of public security, health, education, development, justice, and other services to the population. A weak state is one in which the government has low credibility, as explained by Francisco Leal Buitrago, sociologist and honorary Professor of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and Universidad de Los Andes, who asserts, “State weakness is reflected in its poor ability to build confidence in their institutions, negotiate interests and institutionalize conflict resolution.”⁴³ As a result, the lack of presence of government allows other organizations to fulfill the government tasks and acquire greater legitimacy than the government itself. Terrorists, rebels groups, and criminal organizations can take advantage of the absence of the state to establish their own rules in its place. Often, terrorists or rebels end up providing services that the state should provide, and reap the natural resources they can find in the area for their own benefit.

Territorial control becomes the primary objective of both the government and the terrorist organization(s), when there is a weakness of state. Consequently, whoever has control of the territory acquires the advantage of exploiting the natural resources, as well as managing the income taxes collected from those regions. Thus, a war is triggered between the government and rebel groups to achieve territorial control and reap the benefits that territorial control bestows. Those who control the resources use them to finance the war by gaining income taxes and exploitation of natural resources. This demonstrates the states weakness, prolonging the conflict period forcing the warring parties to look for a negotiated solution to finish the conflict.

In the post-conflict stage, after a negotiated settlement, the government is expected to occupy all the regions where its presence has been weak. Subsequently, the government is able to meet its obligations to its citizens. First, there is an expectation to

⁴³ Francisco Leal, “Por qué la Guerra en Colombia,” [Why the War in Colombia] *Razon Publica*, March 18, 2012, <http://www.razonpublica.com/index.php/conflicto-drogas-y-paz-temas-30/2808-por-que-la-guerra-en-colombia.html>.

increase security in those regions, with inhabitants needing greater security against possible retaliatory attacks from armed groups that still exist or that could reorganize resistance. Those armed groups that appear after negotiations are dissident groups, who often find in the aftermath of war, the ideal business, profiting through illicit activities. Therefore, they are unlike many terrorist groups who demand during negotiations after the war's end that the armed forces and the police should be strengthened to protect the territory left by the rebel factions and the public residing there. The presence by government forces will have to gain favor with and support from the population to establish the effective rule of law.

The public security of a nation is a prerequisite not only for those demobilized, but also for the general population. Security not only allows greater cooperation between the citizens and the armed forces, it also ensures that other government entities feel free to work. As a result, the state can provide services properly, thus allowing the state to comply with its functions. A strong state not only must have strong armed forces, but also robust social and economic policies in order to reduce the emergence of social problems that can be manipulated to challenge lawful governance. Thus, if public security does not exist in a post-conflict environment and the government continues to be weak, new threats will appear to challenge the rule of law and governance and a recurrence of war would be the result. The latter is reaffirmed by Joseph Halon, a social scientist and Senior Lecturer in Development Policy and Practice at the Open University in United Kingdom, who says: "Weaker states often lack the resources to satisfy demands and maintain the peace; violence may seem the only way to force a government to meet group demands, leading to a civil war."⁴⁴ Therefore, the incapacity of the government to implement real presence over all its territory and exert control over that territory permits the recurrence of war.

F. GREED

Many conflicts are generated by the unequal distribution of the gross domestic product in a country from the resources of a nation. Countries with an economy that is

⁴⁴ Joseph Hanlon, "Roots of Civil War: Tick 'All of the Above,'" in *Civil War, Civil Peace*, ed. Helen Yanacopulos and Joseph Hanlon (Oxford: Bath Press, 2006), 83.

dependent mainly on a single commodity, for example, oil, gold, or diamonds, are prone to unpredictable global fluctuations in the international market, which limits the beneficiaries of the proceeds from those resources. Therefore, segments of the population find organized acts of violence the best way to ensure their needs in an insecure economic environment. The government's failure to provide a secure economic environment can lead to grievances and even violence on the part of the most vulnerable segments of the population. By contrast, those who benefit the most economically, regardless of market fluctuations, could be considered the greedy. Greed is what makes those who benefit the most, prefer war as a means to continue enjoying the benefits of monopolizing the gross domestic product of a nation. William Reno, Professor at the Department of Political Science and Director of the Program of African Studies at Northwestern University, argues, "The economic interest of belligerents may be a powerful barrier to the termination of conflict. They may use war to control land and commerce, exploit labor, and ensure the continuity of assets and privileges to a group."⁴⁵ Accordingly, giving up those economic privileges to obtain peace becomes one of the first obstacles to overcome in future negotiations.

When a negotiated settlement during the post-conflict period provides less economic benefit than during the period of war, this situation is difficult to sustain. Hence, war seems like the only option for those who want to continue to have control over the fiscal benefits they receive from profit bearing activities, whether the money is made legally or illegally. The desire for money and power ends up overcoming any ideology that has led to support for a disadvantaged group seeking to recover its rights. The need for financial capital is necessary to carry out a war and meet even a small portion of the population's needs. Yet sometimes, the demands of a few privileged groups makes waging war over the control of economic resources of a nation the preferred option for those who wish to maintain their privileges. Nevertheless, when war reaches a stalemate, those groups that have been fighting the government may have accumulated large amounts of money from illicit activities, and so they may decide to negotiate.

⁴⁵ William Reno, "Shadow States and the Political Economy of War," in *Greed and Grievance: Economics Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 64.

With negotiations terrorists, rebel organizations, and criminal groups try to avoid any loss of the economic privileges they have acquired through war. Negotiation becomes a way to legalize their illegal means of obtaining income and, if possible, obtain greater economic power. Hence, when their economic power is maintained during the post-conflict period, these groups can put pressure on certain deprived social groups to gain their support. If at any time, the economic benefits and the living conditions of those demobilized are not the same in the post-conflict period, the terrorists will use their best efforts to make things turn again in their favor, meaning war. Collier confirms this interest in war of certain groups who have better economic benefits in his article, “Doing Well out of War,” saying: “Although societies as a whole suffer economically from civil war, some small identifiable groups do well out of it. They thus have an interest in the initiation, perpetuation, and renewal of conflict.”⁴⁶ Money and greed for power, instead of ideology, leads those who previously received large sums of money from illegal activities to continue with persistent interest even after a negotiated settlement.

G. DESTRUCTION FROM THE PREVIOUS CIVIL WAR

The wounds of war are not easy to heal and generate deep distrust among the parties’ that were previously in conflict. Usually, statistics of war show the number of violent deaths and devastation, mainly from the loss of infrastructure, caused by violent attacks used to break the will of the opponents. However, at the end of the war, the statistics of war do not show the total number of people injured or affected in some way by the war, such as those who suffered from psychological trauma. The statistics do show the number of victims, but they often do not measure qualitative factors, such as hatred and resentment. The resentment is generated not only in the civilian population, but also among those who fought. Those who took part in hostilities are usually trained to kill without remorse. The combatant conveys the idea that the enemy deserves death, thereby increasing levels of destruction. Walter proposes that, “Wars that inflict high costs on combatants and supporters could exacerbate animosity between them and create a strong desire for retribution even if the war ends. By this logic, high casualty rates make it less

⁴⁶ Paul Collier, “Doing Well Out of War,” in *Greed and Grievance: Economics Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David Malone (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000), 110.

likely that former enemies will ever successfully integrate into a single coherent society.”⁴⁷ Therefore, the reconciliation process is much more complex in situations where war has lasted for long periods and caused much strife between combatants and civilians. This mistrust and insecurity make any act resemble a potential act of aggression and therefore a return to war becomes an option.

On the other hand, long periods of war and destruction could make combatants and civilians more aware of the devastating effects, and thus convince them to continue toward peaceful efforts. Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie, and Donald Rothchild, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at the University of California, claim that “long civil wars thus seem to convince groups of the futility of prevailing and thus the need to accommodate one another’s interest in a manner that mitigate security concerns.”⁴⁸ As a result, Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild assert, “If adversaries’ experiences over time have the effect of convincing them that they cannot prevail in battle, they may well calculate that returning to war has no payoff.”⁴⁹ It is necessary to create confidence between the parties previously in conflict, so that the levels of insecurity do not persist. The reintegration process is important to generate peace links between sectors previously hurt by each other. Finally, if war wounds do not heal during the post-conflict period and hatred and the need for revenge continues, the recurrence of war is imminent.

H. CONCLUSIONS

After the warring parties decide to end the war through a negotiated settlement, it is difficult to determine how long a negotiation can last. Sometimes negotiations take months, in other situations, years. The length of the conflict, the causes of the conflict, and the damage caused during wartime influence negotiations. But, if negotiations are difficult, implementation is even more difficult. Walter argues with respect to implementation: “The

⁴⁷ David Mason, Mehmet Gurses, Patrick Brandt, and Jason Quinn, “When Civil Wars Recur: Conditions for Durable Peace after Civil Wars,” *International Studies Perspectives* 12, no. 2 (2011): 179. Doi: 10.1111/j.1528-3585.2011.00426.x

⁴⁸ Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild, “Stabilizing the Peace after Civil War,” 198.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 190.

terms of a compromised agreement by all parties can be very difficult to achieve, but the implementation can be a critical barrier to successful cooperation. Whenever such an agreement is created, there is the potential for devastating opportunities for those that want to exploit the post-treaty environment.⁵⁰ As soon as agreements are reached, there is a period in which the parties are willing to cooperate and to continue their peace efforts. Therefore, parties must make an extra effort at this time to make the peace persist. Over time, former interests of the conflicting groups may reappear and cause a breach in the agreements, motivating the parties to return to war.

To maximize the chances that peace will prevail after a negotiated settlement, the parties to that settlement need to have the will to perpetuate this period of peace. Peace does not depend on a third party, and it has been evident in the analysis of the previously discussed factors that peace depends on commitments between previous enemies. Therefore, war recurs through the parties lack of commitment to uphold the agreements made in the negotiations. All the factors mentioned in this chapter influence not only recurrence, but also are considered the main causes for the onset of a civil war. Clarifying that, a war can be initiated by a single factor or a mixture of several factors. It is necessary that during negotiations, adequate processes are established to help minimize the occurrence or reoccurrence of these factors in the period of post conflict. The economic and political recovery by countries devastated by war is not easy. Reintegration processes for ex-combatants may be more painful than the war itself, because rejection and social exclusion makes them feel better in war than outside of it. When this phase begins, Call argues, “It is an initial step moving toward peace and ensuring that it sticks is more important than ever.”⁵¹ Hence, the efforts to maintain peace will be greater than the efforts made to wage war.

⁵⁰ Barbara Walter, *Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 8.

⁵¹ Call, “Why Peace Fails,” 1.

III. ANGOLA

During the period discussed in this chapter, from 1975 to the early 2000s, there were a series of proxy intrastate conflicts backed by global super powers, stemming from the Cold War. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) backed guerrilla insurgencies in multiple geographic realms, while the United States often supported the opposing forces in those insurgencies. The majority of such conflicts ended between the late 1990s and early 2000s. The purpose of this study is to find successful examples for transitioning to peace from Colombia might be able to learn. Are there qualitative methods that could be derived from analyzing Angola?

In the following case study focusing on Angola, the authors review its historical experience with civil war and expound upon the factors for successful transition from civil war to sustainable peace. To work toward a persistent peace, the experience of Angola suggests that Colombia must consider the positive contributing factors of power sharing among the previous warring parties, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations with international support, and economic development.

This chapter has four main sections. The first section presents the historical context of the civil war in Angola. The second offers an analysis of both ending hostilities and carrying out negotiations, along with the role of civil society in “making the peace.” The third section examines the chosen form of governance and whether elections were held, as well as the implementation of the peace accords—called “keeping the peace.” Finally, the fourth section offers a discussion of the factors that led to successful sustainable peace—called “sustaining peace”—and takeaways from the analysis of the Angolan experience. The following section is a historical introduction to Angola and its civil war. By understanding the history leading up to the civil war and the possible causes for Angola becoming embroiled in civil war serves to support a better understanding of the experience, and how warring parties’ resolved their issues as they moved towards peace.

A. THE ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR

The Portuguese, who ruled Angola, were a leading colonial power on the African continent, imposing foreign rule as early as the late 15th century.⁵² With other European powers such as the British and French beginning to decolonize their territories in Africa from the 1950s to 1960s, Portuguese authorities resisted giving Angola independence. The aftermath of Angola's large-scale riots, along with the unfolding of an internal division among the Portuguese elite, made the Angolan Civil War inevitable.⁵³ The author of *Angola: A Modern Military History* stated:

When insurgents launched their campaign to end more than four centuries of Portuguese rule, in early 1961, it appeared to be a striking, albeit unexpectedly violent example of the admirable “wind of change,” which British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan previously observed sweeping across Africa.⁵⁴

The geopolitical situation grew quickly into a state of turmoil with grievances from indigenous Angolans wanting greater political and economic inclusion. The major political rivalries turned into combatant groups and fought what seemed to be an unending civil war.

The creation of different rebel groups was spurred by each one wanting its own interests to be realized and becoming “embroiled in a multi-sided struggle for power between right and left wing elements, as well as separatists in different provinces.”⁵⁵ The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) eventually emerged as the strongest and most powerful group to this day, holding the majority of political power. The MPLA was established in 1956, evolving out of the Angolan Communist Party. They gained domestic support from the indigenous people and intracontinental support from other African countries, the nation of Cuba, and the USSR. The other rebel groups included the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), supported domestically by the

⁵² James Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts since World War II* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 77.

⁵³ Stephen Weigert, *Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961–2002* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵Ibid., 80.

Bakongo people; they sought the rebirth of the historical Kongo Empire, with external support coming from the governments of Zaire and China.⁵⁶ The third group to wield power in Angola, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), established in 1966, was led by Jonas Savimbi.⁵⁷ When the MPLA took control of the capital, the group effectively solidified itself as the ruling party and declared independence from Portugal in November of 1975.⁵⁸ After liberation from Portugal was secured, there was a series of civil wars fought corresponding to a series of ceasefires and accords, which led to an enduring peace accord signing in 2002.

The first Angolan Civil War began after gaining independence from Portugal, from 1975 to 1992. In the latter part of this civil war, foreign support dwindled for the MPLA, due to communism losing favor among external financial backers. As a result, a negotiated settlement became a widely accepted move to end to the conflict and preserve gains in power. There were negotiations for a new constitution and support for a multi-party system, which became popular among all parties, as an inclusive measure towards power sharing. When internationally recognized free and balanced elections took place in Angola, the MPLA received a majority of votes, which caused the UNITA to accuse them of electoral fraud and prompted a recurrence of civil war.⁵⁹

The second Angolan Civil War raged on after renewed hostilities that lasted from 1992 to 2002.⁶⁰ A turn of events that occurred as the internal fighting continued was when UNITA gained support from international powers such as the United States and the United Kingdom, along with the regional power, South Africa. The new support put a great deal of pressure on UNITA to reach a peaceful solution. As a result, the Lusaka Accord was signed in 1994, by which both parties attempted to reach a peaceful solution

⁵⁶ Fernando Andresen Guimarães, *The Origins of the Angolan Civil War: Foreign Intervention and Domestic Political Conflict, 1961–76* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 48.

⁵⁷ Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Conflict*, 78.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 78.

⁵⁹ “Former Rebel Leader Claims Angola Election Is Fraudulent: Jonas Savimbi also Warns Civil War Might be Renewed,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 4, 1992.
<http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/272673868?accountid=12702>.

⁶⁰ Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Conflict*, 93.

by requiring greater inclusionary policies between the MPLA and UNITA. Unfortunately, after the two groups failed to develop inclusionary policies, tensions led to the expulsion of UNITA delegates from the government. After UNITA refused to accept the results of the election in 1992⁶¹ and affirm the peace deal in 1994,⁶² the group was thrown out of the national government, and the aggregate effect led to alienation from international benefactors.

The key development that changed the course of events toward eventual peace occurred when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi was killed. In the *Daily Telegraph*, his obituary reads: “JONAS SAVIMBI, the Angolan rebel leader … has been shot dead, aged 67, received the backing of the West in his battle against Angola’s Marxist regime during the Cold War, but later became an international outcast as he refused to stop waging war on his country’s government.”⁶³ After the death of UNITA’s charismatic leader, Jonas Savimbi in February 2002, a peace agreement between UNITA and the Angolan government was brokered and signed in April 2002, successfully ending the protracted Angolan civil war.⁶⁴ The peace agreement called for all combatants from UNITA to demobilize and become integrated into the Angolan army and police forces, while at the same time create a political party.⁶⁵

B. FROM ENDING A CIVIL WAR TO SUSTAINING THE PEACE

The transition from war to sustaining the peace takes on a complex nature that does not have a simple template solution for all nations working for persistent peace. However, as a framework for the following sections, there are some generally accepted

61 “Angola–UNAVEM,” United Nations, accessed November 1, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm>.

62 “The Lusaka Peace Process,” Human Right Watch, accessed November 1, 2016, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/angola/Angl998-04.htm>.

63 “Obituary of Jonas Savimbi Angolan Rebel Leader Who Founded UNITA and Lost the Support of the West After Failing to Accept Peace Terms,” *Daily Telegraph*, February 25, 2002. <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/317596357?accountid=12702>.

64 “Savimbi ‘Died with Gun in Hand,’” *BBC*, February 25, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1839252.stm>.

65 United Nations, “Agenda for the memorandum of understanding,” Aril 26, 2002. https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/sites/default/files/accords/The_Luena_Agreement_2002.pdf

phases that experts agree make up the process. The first phase after a civil war has ended is called making peace; the second phase is called keeping the peace; and the last is sustaining the peace.⁶⁶

1. Phase I: Making Peace

This section provides greater understanding of Angola's peace process and the role of civil society. In Angola, there are clear examples of negotiated peace settlements; however, Angola's experience was somewhat of a hybrid process, since there was a pending accord from 1994, though it was not officially enacted until UNITA's leader died in 2002. Angola was able to end the fighting and adopt a formal agreement to move toward peace. The following discussion centers on the process Angola took and addresses how Angola chose to achieve a settlement.

2. Angola's Transition to Making the Peace

Angola experienced three attempts at making peace and was not successful until the death of Jonas Savimbi, when the country completed the agreement from 1994. The formalized final agreement ending hostilities was the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The majority of civil society was in support of the MPLA holding power and expressed this through elections held in 1992. The United Nations (UN) had a supporting role in its mandate called the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA).

The first accord, called the Bicesse Peace Accord, was signed on May 31, 1991.⁶⁷ It declared a cease fire and assigned "the responsibility of the Government of Angola and UNITA to act under the Joint Political and Military Commission (CCPM)."⁶⁸ The accord began the process toward democratization, leading to the first elections with multiple parties, including the presidential elections in September of 1992. The results of these

⁶⁶ "From Civil War to Civil Society: The Transition from War to Peace in Guatemala and Liberia," The World Bank and The Carter Center, July 2007, <https://www.cartercenter.org/documents/1200.pdf>.

⁶⁷ "Bicesse Accords Signed 22 Years Ago," *AllAfrica.Com*, May 30, 2013, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1357152339?accountid=12702>

⁶⁸ Ibid.

elections were confirmed by international observers as being free and fair, and the MPLA was lawfully placed in the position as the ruling party. The results, however, were disputed by UNITA leadership, and the country relapsed into civil war. The failed attempt with the first accord led to a more brutal and much bloodier period for Angola.

The second accord was called the Lusaka Protocol and was signed on November 20, 1994, by Angola's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Venancio de Moura, and the ex-UNITA secretary general, Eugenio Ngolo Manuvakola.⁶⁹ The protocol made provisions for the creation of a government with Greater Unity and Reconciliation to ensure continued momentum toward durable peace. The accord lasted for only about four years and called for the demobilization of the Angolan Government forces and UNITA's armed element.

Unfortunately, Angola reverted to a bloody internal conflict in 1998. The government forces pushed into rural areas in the eastern provinces to maneuver the population into urban centers. The displacement of innocent civilians by the government led to a flooding of urban centers and a humanitarian catastrophe.⁷⁰ Although the civil society was negatively affected, the military campaign had a positive effect for the government by pushing UNITA fighters to surrender, thus weakening the rebel group. The final event leading to the demise of UNITA came from the death of Jonas Savimbi. His death opened the door to completing the previously brokered peace accord.

The formalized armistice was signed as a memorandum of understanding by both parties on April 4, 2002. "The memorandum, which will be annexed to the Lusaka Protocol, was signed by General Geraldo Sachipengo 'Nunda,' deputy chief of staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, and General Abreu Muengo 'Kamorteiro,' chief of the Supreme General Staff of the UNITA Military Forces."⁷¹

⁶⁹ "Angola's Lusaka Peace Protocol Signed 20 Years Ago," *AllAfrica.Com*, November 20, 2014, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1626735007?accountid=12702>

⁷⁰ Danna Harman, "The Displaced Fight to Survive as Angola's Decades-Long War Drags on, It is Becoming More and More Difficult to Feed the Needy," *Christian Science Monitor*, July 18, 2001. <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/405655856?accountid=12702>

⁷¹ "Angolan Army, UNITA Forces Sign Cease-Fire Memorandum," *BBC*, Mar 30, 2002, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/450200482?accountid=12702>

One of the first provisions to be implemented under the Luena Memorandum was Angola's DDR program for UNITA combatants, as they began integrating into the Angolan Armed Forces and police forces. Often the first step in a DDR program, the memorandum defined assembly points for UNITA combatants and how they would be disarmed. The memorandum additionally called for UNITA's transformation into a purely political party and the reinstatement of government administration throughout the country.⁷²

The UN's presence had minimal effect on the situation for implementation. Since UNITA forces did not want to comply with the 1994 protocol; the UN's effort lost momentum and became irrelevant in the process. UNITA's preference to continue with military operations instead of complying with the 1994 accord delayed the formal beginning to keep and sustain the peace. When the war re-ignited, the UN Security Council withdrew all troops. The Angolan Government wrongfully blamed the UN for not disarming UNITA forces. After the death of Jonas Savimbi, UNITA agreed to unite into one party in order to begin national reconciliation.⁷³

The transition for Angola to make peace by establishing their respective accords ended the hostilities that fueled their civil wars, but this is the most basic of steps taken toward establishing sustained peace. The necessity for sovereign nations and insurgent guerrilla groups to uphold peace accords is fundamental to move to the next phase.⁷⁴

⁷² “Angola: Peace Brings Fresh Humanitarian Challenges,” *Middle East News Online*, April 2, 202, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/203118372?accountid=12702>.

⁷³ Caroline Guyot, and Alex Vines, “United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (UNAVEM),” In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Joachim Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul Williams (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, September, 2014), <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686049.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199686049-e-7?print=pdf>.

⁷⁴ Amy Ross, “United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINIGUA),” In *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Joachim Koops, Thierry Tardy, Norrie MacQueen, and Paul Williams (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, September, 2014) <http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199686049.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199686049-e-51>.

3. Phase II: Angola Keeping the Peace

This section provides greater understanding of Angola's post-conflict governance, elections, and issues related to implementation of the peace accords. The transition from making peace to keeping it involves disarming, demobilizing, and reintegration of combatant troops, SSR setting up transitional security apparatuses, and free and fair elections, along with implementation of negotiated settlement objectives. This section addresses how Angola chose to keep the peace, and begins to answer questions for sustaining it.

a. Angola's Transition to Keeping the Peace

The University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies has placed Angola at an overall completion rate for implementing their peace accords, since inception, at 88 percent.⁷⁵ The Luena Memorandum, signed in 2002, initiated the end to hostilities in Angola. "The memorandum, which will be annexed to the Lusaka Protocol, was signed by General Geraldo Sachipengo 'Nunda,' deputy chief of staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, and General Abreu Muengo 'Kamorteiro,' chief of the Supreme General Staff of the UNITA Military Forces."⁷⁶ The symbolic commitment made by the senior officers of each side gave proof early on that the declaration for a ceasefire had the support at the highest levels between these two organizations, "aimed at ending the armed conflict in order to achieve peace and national reconciliation."⁷⁷

After the signing of the Luena Memorandum, troops from UNITA began the demobilization process by traveling to designated assembly points. A senior member of the UNITA, General Samuel Chiwale, "instructed his troops to report to the assembly points in the Luena agreement immediately."⁷⁸ In April 2003, Ibrahim A. Gambari,

⁷⁵ "Luena Memorandum of Understanding," University of Notre Dame, accessed September 15, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁷⁶ "Angolan Army, UNITA Forces Sign Cease-Fire Memorandum," BBC, March 30, 2002, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/450200482?accountid=12702>.

⁷⁷ "Cease Fire: Luena Memorandum of Understanding," University of Notre Dame, accessed September 15, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/cease-fire-luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁷⁸ "UNITA Forces in Northern Front Begin Implementing Luena Accord," BBC, April 4, 2002.

United Nations Under-Secretary-General and Special Adviser on Africa, commented on Angola's progress by stating that:

From the moment that ceasefire was declared in March 2002 until today, no single shot has been fired, and no skirmishes have been reported in violations of the cease-fire. The process of disarmament of UNITA was completed and members of UNITA forces were integrated into the national army and police.⁷⁹

On April 4 of each year since the signing of the Luena Memorandum, Angola has been able to commemorate with celebration as a day of peace and reconciliation between the MPLA and the UNITA. The following benchmarks helped to solidify the ceasefire and move towards the next phase.

C. DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION

The DDR program in Angola by all accounts is widely considered a case study for success. The numbers are astounding, with nearly all combatants—estimated at over 80,000—complying, from the most senior leaders to the foot soldiers and with an estimated 400,000 family members. The strategy taken by President Dos Santos' government worked in his favor by prioritizing those members of UNITA that could be the greatest threat to peace and had the ability to consolidate forces to have the forces to revert to conflict. Dr. Imogen Parsons from the London School of Economics describes the strategy by stating, “senior generals and officers could be ‘bought off’, and the rank and file definitively separated from their leaders—an effective strategy on the part of the government.”⁸⁰ The package received per combatant was nearly, “5 months back payments of salaries according to military rank, a US\$100 reintegration allowance and a ‘kit’ of basic household items and tools, as well as full identity and demobilization documentation.” The family members of combatants received a small amount of aid in comparison.

⁷⁹ “Angola: Rebuilding the Nation: National Reconciliation and Peace,” *Africa News*, April 9, 2003.

⁸⁰ Imogen Parsons, “Beyond the Silencing of Guns: Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration,” *Accord* 15 (2004): 41. http://www.c-r.org/downloads/Accord%2015_9Beyond%20the%20silencing%20of%20guns_2004_ENG.pdf.

The process for disarming combatants is shown to have transferred almost 90 percent of the remaining weapons, with the other 10 percent still in the hands of the civilian population. Although the remaining arms in possession of civilians did not materialize into another armed conflict, the country continues to be heavily armed. According to Imogen Parsons, in her article “Beyond the Silencing of Guns Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration,” “the Angolan Police cit[e] a figure of 3–4 million small arms and light weapons in the hands of civilians.”⁸¹ There have been initiatives to disarm the civilian population, but nothing has been executed. Within Angolan civil society, it is often considered a necessity to own a weapon for personal security and to demonstrate political affiliation.

The process for reintegration has not received the necessary attention or resources and has continued to be a challenge for many prior combatants. There were stalled attempts to help support reintegration efforts, but setbacks were the inadequate support to track funds and administer programs outside the capital of Luanda. This highlights a fundamental issue with establishing strategic support outside the center of government where ex-combatants will settle:

Institutions and bodies established to handle resettlement, return, and reintegration have a weak presence in the provinces, and there is little effective coordination between the activities of the various national and international NGOs. Reintegration is also taking place in the context of the return of around 3–4 million IDPs [internally displaced persons] and almost half a million refugees, often to areas with weak state administrative capacity, and serious constraints on access to areas of resettlement.⁸²

After a civil war, the internal animosity and emotional toll within a nation that was previously divided is understandable. However, to reach sustainable peace, ex-combatants “should not be seen to benefit unduly from their participation in the war. Rather reintegration presupposes their integration into a community and the development of that community as a whole, not as individuals or ‘target groups.’”⁸³ The balancing act

⁸¹ Parsons, “Beyond the Silencing of Guns,” 43.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Parsons, “Beyond the Silencing of Guns,” 43.

of reintegrating ex-combatants and their families is difficult, but with a strategic approach, international support, and adequate people and resources placed where ex-combatants plan to settle it can be achieved.

D. SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

SSR is not palliative or short term. It is a core element of multi-dimensional peacekeeping and peacebuilding, essential for addressing the roots of conflict and building the foundations of long-term peace and development.

—Ban Ki-moon, Secretary General of the United Nations.⁸⁴

The importance of emphasizing SSR is an absolute necessity for any nation to make the transition from civil war to sustained peace. It is widely accepted that security sector institutions include the military, police forces, border security, customs officials, and correctional facilities. The security sector can more broadly include the judicial sector, which will oversee the prosecution of human rights and misuse of force. For purposes of this study, the two main institutions to implement reforms after conflict include the military and police forces.

The delegations from UNITA and MPLA negotiated responsibility for integration of UNITA forces in the Lusaka Protocol. The two parties' agreed upon integrating members of all ranks from UNITA into the Angolan Armed Forces and National Police. The responsibility for integrating UNITA's junior military officers and enlisted personnel was given to UNITA's high general staff, while mid-grade officers to general officers fell on the Angolan Armed Forces to integrate. Finally, the responsibility for incorporation and designation of senior police ranks such as commissioner and superintendents fell on the highest-level command of the National Police.

In 2002, Angola's Joint Military Commission spokesperson, "General Francisco Furtado had announced that the integration of UNITA military forces into the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and National Police would commence on 19 July.... In July, a total

⁸⁴ "The United Nations SSR perspective," United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, accessed October 20, 2016, <http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/pdf/securityreform.pdf>.

of 30 UNITA Generals joined the FAA as part of a military integration process.”⁸⁵ Additionally, 224 UNITA troops were sworn into the national army.⁸⁶ These numbers increased substantially in 2003, with over 5,007 UNITA troops, “four generals, eight lieutenant-generals, 18 brigadiers, 40 colonels, 60 lieutenant-colonels, 100 majors, 150 captains, 200 lieutenants, 250 sub-lieutenants, and 40 UNITA generals were incorporated into positions within the National Police.”⁸⁷ This effectively completed the implementation of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding and Lusaka Protocol for military and police integration.

E. GOVERNANCE REFORM

Angola’s reconciliation efforts for greater inclusion in governance were initiated with the signing of the 1994 Lusaka Protocol and reaffirmed with the signing of the Luena Memorandum. The changes once agreed upon led to greater integration of and participation from UNITA, with respect to civil administration, electoral and political parties, and the overall transitional government’s ability to share power.

The theme of inclusivity to power sharing is important for countering efforts to revert to hostilities. The concessions made during the peace agreement led to change within the government and to security reform. The following are reforms highlighting the path Angola undertook in order to keep the peace and begin to share power.

Angola’s commitment among warring parties’ for reconciliation set the stage for members from UNITA to participate in all levels of the government and in institutions with influence over the political, administrative, and economic activities of the country. The political concessions enforced were agreed upon during the Lusaka Protocol and reaffirmed with the Luena Memorandum. They were made legal by the Angolan National Assembly allowing the “first 70 deputies elected on the lists of UNITA candidates ... be

⁸⁵ “Angola: 30 UNITA Generals Join National Army as Integration of Forces Begins,” *BBC*, Jul 18, 2002, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/450153650?accountid=12702>.

⁸⁶ “Military Reform: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed November 1, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

installed in their functions in the National Assembly... [and] shall constitute the UNITA parliamentary group ... all the deputies in the National Assembly shall enjoy the rights, freedoms, guarantees, immunities, and privileges provided by the law.”⁸⁸ At present, there are five political parties, including the warring factions of UNITA and MPLA, with 32 members holding office from the UNITA party out of 220 national assembly members.⁸⁹ The MPLA continues to dominate the national assembly, but it has effectively integrated some representation from UNITA.

The Lusaka Protocol initiated power sharing within the civil administration in 1997, which mandated 11 senior level positions among the cabinet level ministries in the Angolan Government.⁹⁰ The MPLA has been slow to make this mandate a reality, but started in 1997 when President Dos Santos appointed his cabinet of 28 ministers into the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation.⁹¹ According to the decree signed by the president, four of the 28 cabinet ministers were from the former rebel movement of UNITA. They were the Minister of Geology and Mines, Marcos Samondo; the Health Minister, Anastacio Ruben Sikato; the Minister of Trade, Victorino Hossi; and the Minister of Hotels and Tourism, Jorge Valentim. The other 24 ministers were from President Dos Santos’ MPLA party.⁹²

The lack of genuine power sharing from President Dos Santos did not go unnoticed, and in 2004, the leader of UNITA spoke out expressing his concern for not enough shared political appointments. The overall integration within the federal government included four cabinet level ministers, seven deputy ministers, and six ambassadors. MPLA’s leader began reversing their move towards greater integration by

⁸⁸ “Powersharing Transitional Government: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed September 12, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/powersharing-transitional-government-luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁸⁹ “Miembros da Commisao,” [Constitutional Commission Members] Republic of Angola National Assembly,” accessed September 2016, <http://www.comissaoconstitucional.ao>.

⁹⁰ “Powersharing Transitional Government: Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed September 12, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/powersharing-transitional-government-luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Ibid.

the end of 2004, leaving only one appointed UNITA cabinet member, the Minister of Geology and Mines, Manuel Africano.⁹³ Although, UNITA did not share equitably among senior cabinet ministerial positions, their share of provincial, and local administration postings had a much better outcome.

The Lusaka Protocol called for extensive numbers of provincial and local level positions to be given to UNITA, following the 1994 protocol and reaffirmed with the Luena Memorandum. “In all, 150 administrative positions are mentioned in the Lusaka text, [with] 4 governor positions and 7 deputy governor positions,” and at the municipal level there were 30 administrators, 35 deputy administrators 75 administrators of communes.⁹⁴ Additionally, considerable progress towards making local and municipal positions available to UNITA after the 1994 protocol demonstrated a credible commitment from President Dos Santos to fulfill the provisions of the Lusaka Protocol.

The progress made towards inclusionary reforms within the Angolan Government at the federal, provincial, and local levels was last publicly acknowledged in 2004, by UNITA leadership, when their “Secretary for Information, Adalberto da Costa Junior ... mentioned the swearing in of UNITA administrators and remaining local level appointments.”⁹⁵ The statement suggests a majority of positions offered to UNITA were filled.

The electoral process, a demonstration of democratic will and political participation by a nation’s citizens, demonstrates respect for expression of choice for its leadership. After Jonas Savimbi’s rejection of the results of the elections in 1994 and reengagement in hostilities by UNITA, the electoral process’ fate was not promising. However, in 1998 the Angolan government led by President Dos Santos declared “that UNITA was a fully legalized political party, although multi-party elections would not be

⁹³ “Implementation History: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed September 12, 2016, https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/luena-memorandum-understanding#footnoteref7_qxf21jd.

⁹⁴ “Civil Administration Reform: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed September 14, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

held for several years.”⁹⁶ Later in 2008, Angola held its first elections in over 16 years, with a majority of positions won by President Dos Santos’ ruling party.⁹⁷

F. ANGOLAN FACTORS FOR SUSTAINABLE PEACE

The successful factors of application for sustainable peace are defined Chapter I, including power sharing among the previous warring parties, peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations with international support, and lasting economic development. Each of these factors draws on theories by current academics and application from our case study analysis. While the authors consider the factors to be keys to a successful transition to sustainable peace, not all nations have needed to experience them for a successful outcome.

The Angolan case study has demonstrated an application of the positive factors for sustained peace. Many issues remain, but present day Angola has a greater level of power sharing and has received international support to develop its economic infrastructure, giving greater stake to both sides in the future of the nation. The positive factors for sustainable peace are demonstrated in Angola, except for peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the conventional use of international support from the United Nations.

1. Power Sharing

Angola has made great strides in the area of power sharing since the implementation of the Luena Memorandum. There is much that could still be done to demonstrate true power sharing at the national level, but as earlier analysis would indicate, the local levels have received greater representation by both parties. According to the Notre Dame Peace Accords’ matrix, efforts for power sharing are nearly two-thirds complete, with the greatest outstanding issue being nearly zero representation in the

⁹⁶ “Electoral/Political Party Reform: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed September 16, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/electoralpolitical-party-reform-luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

president's cabinet by the opposition. There has been no new momentum to appoint members of the opposition to his cabinet since 2008.⁹⁸

According to Call, a major factor in resolving the issues that a rebel organization may have in peace negotiations is to establish an agreement of power sharing as a system of governance among which the rebel parties involved in the conflict are granted a role.⁹⁹ The framework for power sharing was established with the signing of the Luena Memorandum and annexed to the Lusaka Protocol. The following statement by Hartzell rings true for the experience in Angola that, “[a]greements that preserve adversaries’ organizations and call for them to share power will stabilize the peace by providing rivals with a stake in the state and by making it difficult for opponents to use force to alter war-ending bargains.”¹⁰⁰

In the case of Angola, the agreement made helped to keep the rebel group politically intact; however, the DDR process dismantled its organizational structure, thus neutralizing the armed faction of the organization. The leadership was given the opportunity to lead through Angola’s political process and to share in the power structure of the state. A great majority of UNITA’s senior leadership and lower ranking members were integrated into the military and police forces. Through integration a form of power sharing was given to all members of the former rebel group, as well as a stake in the future of the state and their own economic well-being from steady employment.

2. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding Operations

The United Nations Observer Mission in Angola had a very limited effect. When Jonas Savimbi was not content with the outcome of the elections in the post Lusaka Protocol period, the United Nations mission became inconsequential. The leadership of UNITA decided that reverting to hostilities was the only way to move towards peace. Then President Dos Santos alleged that MONUA was not fulfilling its mandate to disarm

⁹⁸“Powersharing Transitional Government: Luena Memorandum of Understanding,” University of Notre Dame, accessed September 28, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/luena-memorandum-understanding>.

⁹⁹ Charles Call, *Why Peace Fails*, 40.

¹⁰⁰ Caroline Hartzell, “Settling Civil Wars Armed Opponents,” 348.

the rebel group and force transition. When both parties chose to revert to hostilities, the UN Security Council withdrew its peacekeeping forces. After the UN was unable to support keeping the peace, other approaches were implemented, such as sanctions. The peace process did not resume until after the death of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, prompting the signing of the Luena Memorandum of Understanding. The leadership of UNITA agreed to end the civil war and begin to keep the peace.

The Luena Memorandum, after the death of Savimbi, was signed indicating the rebel groups' commitment to peace. Although the literature has made it clear that intervention by the international community helps to sustain the peace, the Angolan experience demonstrates that international support is helpful; however, not having peacekeeping forces did not prohibit Angola from ending the civil war and sustaining the peace. The efforts of international actors to support conflict-ridden states from avoiding a recurrence to armed conflict are well worth the purpose for using them,¹⁰¹ but are not required.

3. Economic Development

The economic environment in a post conflict nation requires reforms to be enacted to stimulate economic growth and interjection of timely international aid to avoid the relapse in hostilities. There is no clear-cut solution to fix the ills of post-conflict economies in a short period; however, good economic policies have the opportunity to diminish the risk of renewed hostilities. According to Collier, "Economic strategy can only complement other strategies for keeping the post-conflict peace." Collier advocates for a dual strategy relying on economic and political reforms and suggests technical expertise tends to focus more on political rather than economic strategies due to the type of individuals commonly writing the policies.

The Angolan economy has grown since the end of the conflict to become one of the strongest in the region and it has thrived simply through the ending of the civil war, which had a substantial positive impact. For countries that end their civil wars, the

¹⁰¹ Virginia Fortna, "Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 48, no. 2 (2004): 288.

potential growth rate can be very high. “Angola experienced double digit growth in GDP [gross domestic product] annually in the period 2002–2008. In the last five of these years, average annual growth was at 17 [percent], which more than doubled the size of the economy.”¹⁰²

During the decade following a conflict, external forces should maintain the peace, while pursuing economic recovery policies. Collier further argues that “the most common policy error of post-conflict governments is to maintain military spending around conflict levels.” A reduction in military spending can reduce the risk of further conflict and the resources utilized to benefit those economic policies. The priority for policy reforms in most post-conflict nations includes reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure, integration from the rural economy into the national markets, and enforcement of property rights. The post-conflict period is a time to build strong public/private partnerships, which can be developed to enforce contract law, strengthen accountability among public entities, and support creation of a sound ethical business environment. If strong accountability and ethical practices are cultivated early on, then a patronage system will have less ability to develop.

In the case of Angola, its oil rich resources have provided a steady flow of funding to the government however creating challenges for diversifying the economy.

The booming oil industry creates wealth in related sectors—finance, hospitality, and other industries that service oil companies—but it also makes it costlier for everyone to do business. Aftereffects of the civil war have exacerbated these asymmetries. Economists say the Angolan government has done an admirable job at stabilizing the economy—reducing inflation (which was in the triple digits during the war) and paying back creditors.¹⁰³

Angola has chosen to focus on large-scale infrastructure projects instead of educating its workforce. The shortfall in technical skills has diminished the government’s ability to sustain large-scale work projects. “Government ministries were returning up to

¹⁰²Arne Wiig and Ivar Kolstad, “Opinion: Is Oil-rich Angola a Development Success?” CNN, August 30, 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/30/opinion/opinion-angola-development-elections/>.

¹⁰³Stephanie Hanson, “Angola’s Political and Economic Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/world/angolas-political-economic-development/p16820>.

40 percent of their budgets to the Treasury...because projects couldn't be implemented,”¹⁰⁴ stated by Hare, Executive Director of the U.S.-Angola Chamber of Commerce. Angola’s experience in a post-conflict scenario has been successful, but relied too heavily on its oil and not on diversifying the economy. A vast majority of the population lives in abject poverty and has not experienced the economic gains that those at the top have enjoyed.

G. CONCLUSION

For nearly 30 years, the Angolan Civil War persisted despite multiple attempts at ending the conflict. After Jonas Savimbi’s death, the MPLA had a clear way forward with the Luena Memorandum to end the civil war and implement peace. Angola achieved a sustainable peace through the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, agreed upon by the warring parties. Through the fulfillment of the peace accord, many of the issues rooted in the origin of the civil war were addressed. The following is an agenda that achieved peace and could serve as an example to future nations ending their own civil wars:

- Ensure political inclusion within the government and particularly the military.
- During the DDR process, have specific assembly points, ensure the collection of *all* arms, and ensure that reintegration is not limited to ex-combatants, but includes families. Allocate resources for reintegration where ex-combatants and family members will settle. For Angola, the integration of combatants into the military served a dual purpose—economic stability and integration.
- Acknowledge that political sharing is important; however, governance has to be accepted by civil society and, if not, then proper representation must be given to ensure inclusion.
- Reduce reliance on international support and increase reliance on domestic efforts to move the country toward enduring peace; if internal issues persist, they can ultimately lead to renewed armed conflict.
- Transform the warring factions into unarmed political groups to give them a stake in the future of a unified country.

¹⁰⁴ Stephanie Hanson, “Angola’s Political and Economic Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 21, 2008, <http://www.cfr.org/world/angolas-political-economic-development/p16820>

- Focus on economic development, particularly on large works projects with a trained and ready workforce to jumpstart the economy, while integrating the rural economy into the national markets, and enforce property rights.

The authors hope that the case study presented has given a thorough analysis of Angola's transition from civil war to sustained peace. The specific factors outlined in the case study illustrate the positive enduring effects that a nation can achieve if it follows a similar process. Such nations can transition from civil war to lasting peace through the process of negotiated settlement and proper implementation. Our initial thoughts that a persistent peace can be achieved through positive factors of power sharing, peace building, and economic development is demonstrated through the experiences in Angola and, hopefully, soon in Colombia.

IV. MOZAMBIQUE

In the following case study, focusing on Mozambique, the authors review its war for independence from Portugal and post-independence civil war, and analyze the contributing factors that have pushed the nation back into renewed conflict. Although it has experienced a return of civil war, Mozambique's initial attempt at peace that lasted almost two decades of peace offers valuable lessons. The negative factors that led to civil war recurrence are analyzed for this purpose. The following factors include: political exclusion, coercion, ethnic discrimination, economic grievances, weak states, greed, and destruction from the previous civil war. The Mozambique civil war ended with a negotiated settlement and near complete implementation of its peace accord; however, unresolved issues have stifled Mozambique's prospects for a durable peace. This is due in part to problems that originated from the onset of its post-independence from Portugal and divisions that persist to the present. The authors draw from historical experiences in Mozambique to suggest ways Colombia could move forward to end its own civil war and build sustainable peace.

This chapter consists of four main sections. The first section presents a historical overview of Mozambique. The second offers an analysis of the peace accords implemented as well as the United Nations' role for peacebuilding. The third section focuses on government reforms and how elections may have caused the renewed conflict; and the fourth section offers a discussion of the negative factors that provide insight into the recurrence of hostilities. The following section presents a historical introduction to the country and Mozambique's experience with civil war. Why did renewed hostilities reoccur in Mozambique, and what negative factors could have received greater attention to prevent the recurrence?

A. BRIEF HISTORY OF MOZAMBIQUE AND ITS CIVIL WAR

The Portuguese began colonization of Mozambique in the 16th century,¹⁰⁵ as they did in Angola. However, in stark contrast, the geographic territory of modern

¹⁰⁵ Thomas Henriksen, *Mozambique: A History* (London: Rex Collings, 1978), 21.

Mozambique is composed of previously existing, strongly unified indigenous kingdoms. The Kingdom of Monomotapa territorial control included, “the entire Zambezi River Valley (modern day Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) from Zumbo in what is now North Central Mozambique to the Indian Ocean.”¹⁰⁶ This made it more difficult for Europeans to penetrate the interior and thus colonization did not quickly take hold past the coastline. The kingdoms were rich from overseas trade and having a network throughout the Indian Ocean and parts of the Middle East.¹⁰⁷ Although the Portuguese arrived in the late 15th century, for the next 400 years the settlers stayed near the coastal regions, trading with the African kingdoms. The Portuguese intended to displace indigenous groups from their monopolistic hold on trade in gold, ivory, and seaport rights.

In the early 17th century, after a generation of war, the kingdom of Monomotapa surrendered its gold to the King of Portugal.¹⁰⁸ This in turn caused land disbursement among Portuguese settlers to ensure control and the initial establishment of a permanent settlement in a semi-feudal organization of estates, termed “prazos,” along the Zambezi River Valley.¹⁰⁹ The Portuguese viceroy from Goa, a small colony in India administered colonial Mozambique.¹¹⁰ The Portuguese began to lose legitimacy due to the gradual loss of control over the economy with inhabitants from India taking control of the ivory trade, and North Americans the slave trade. Since the native Portuguese settlement did not establish strong governance or control over the economy, authority and legitimacy migrated back to the African kingdoms.

The winds of change came to bear after the 1885 Berlin Conference, which placed European powers against one another over laying territorial claims to the colonization of Africa. The colonization rights of Portugal over Mozambique were questioned, because

¹⁰⁶ Kathleen Kemezis, “Monomotapa,” Blackpast.org, accessed November 2, 2016, <http://www.blackpast.org/gah/monomotapa-ca-1450-1917-ad>.

¹⁰⁷ Roberta Maschietto, *Peacebuilding: The Challenges of Empowerment Promotion in Mozambique* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 2016), 84.

¹⁰⁸ Angelo Nicolaides, “Early Portuguese Imperialism: Using the Jesuits in the Mutapa Empire of Zimbabwe,” *International Journal of Peace and Development Studies* 2, no. 4 (April 2011): 137.

¹⁰⁹ Ciment, Encyclopedia of Conflicts, 225.

¹¹⁰ Malyn Newitt, “The Portuguese on the Zambezi: An Historical Interpretation of the Prazo System,” *Journal of African History* 10, no. 1 (1969): 80

their control over the colony had slowly dissipated.¹¹¹ The conference gave Portugal the right to settle lands that were inland; however, due to the lack of adequate resources for expansion they turned to the British, which gladly helped to deter Germans from settling near their colony of Rhodesia. The British supported the Portuguese colony, which continued into the 20th century. The Portuguese reciprocated by sending Mozambican unskilled laborers to work in British mines.

In 1932, under the fascist leadership of Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar, the Portuguese government sought the assertion of control over the colony.¹¹² During this period, companies based in Portugal were encouraged to have trade agreements with Portuguese colonies, which prompted thousands of workers to immigrate to Mozambique. Next, although domestically the Portuguese avoided land reforms they decided instead to move landless peasants to Mozambique. While Portuguese settlers continued to work with indigenous leaders in the interior of Mozambique, settlers on the coastline dominated political and social life, resulting in continued divisions among the population.

The struggle for independence from Portugal was initiated in 1962 by the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), which was established to fight for independence from Portuguese rule.¹¹³ When the Portuguese were not willing to allow the indigenous population to negotiate their liberty, it prompted FRELIMO to push for reforms through military revolution. The Portuguese emplaced countermeasures against such a revolt. They did this by increasing public security and sending more troops; however, these efforts proved ineffective, as the FRELIMO was victorious.¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Saul David, “Slavery and the ‘Scramble for Africa,’ BBC, February 17, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/abolition/scramble_for_africa_article_01.shtml

¹¹² David Wilsford, *Political Leaders of Contemporary Western Europe: A Biographical Dictionary* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995), 395.

¹¹³ Drew Thompson, “Visualizing FRELIMO’s Liberated Zones in Mozambique, 1962–1974,” *Social Dynamics* 39, no. 1 (April, 2013): 27, doi: 10.1080/02533952.2013.774583.

¹¹⁴ “Independence Compared and Contrasted: The United States and Mozambique [and] Whither the Struggle for Mozambique?,” African-American Institute, accessed October 20, 2016, <http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED132091>.

In the wake of independence, war with the Portuguese ended on June 25, 1975, and Mozambique gained its freedom from Portugal.¹¹⁵ FRELIMO defeated the colonial army and a majority of the nation was in support of the group. “Since its formation in 1962 in Dar es Salaam, FRELIMO sought, as part of its central mission, to build a deep sense of national unity among the ethnically and linguistically diverse population.”¹¹⁶ The divisions that existed internally had different leaders, geographically diverse constituencies, and separate expectations of the role for a unified nation.

The FRELIMO policies in the post-independence era made a larger portion of the population discontent with them as the self-designated political power and placed factions against one another. Such policies included making “political opposition illegal, guaranteeing themselves full political power and the opportunity to set the future direction of the entire country. This tight political control was essential for FRELIMO to implement its socialist transformation, including nationalization of services, new systems of governance, and centralized production and control over resources.”¹¹⁷

Another damaging policy was the persecution of groups that had any association with the former Portuguese colonial government. The FRELIMO government sent citizens considered to have benefited from their association to camps. They would be reindoctrinated, or worse imprisoned, if found suspect of not being loyal to the revolutionary cause. Accordingly, “[s]ingled out for particular disdain were former Mozambican members of the police force, the army, and the intelligence units.”¹¹⁸ Any group that operated against the FRELIMO struggle was at risk.

After Mozambique had received independence from Portugal, there were a few reasons for the outbreak of civil war. The burgeoning nation may have fought

¹¹⁵ “Independence Compared and Contrasted: The United States and Mozambique [and] Whither the Struggle for Mozambique?,” African-American Institute, accessed October 20, 2016, <http://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED132091>.

¹¹⁶ Jeremy Weinstein and Laudemino Francisco, “The Civil War in Mozambique: The Balance Between Internal and External Influences,” in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, ed. Nicholas Sambanis and Paul Collier (Washington, DC: The World Bank Publications, 2005), 161.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Weinstein and Francisco, “The Civil War in Mozambique,” 162.

victoriously for its freedom against Portugal, but the divisions that existed internally in Mozambique were not settled from the onset of independence. The regional factions existed from centuries earlier and not all agreed with FRELIMO being their governing body; thus, roots of discontent existed from colonial times through the time of independence. Next, policies enacted by the FRELIMO were not accepted by all segments of the population. Last, the government was not capable to govern from the very beginning; it lacked adequate funds and was not able to ensure public security or enforce the policies it established. Therefore, Mozambique was moving towards civil war due to the volatile security situation in the post-independence period and the status lost by Portuguese settlers under FRELIMO's political control. The political instability that was present in Mozambique led to the establishment of a guerrilla force through armed revolution.

In 1976, the opposition force to FRELIMO was established; the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), led by Dhalakama, mostly drew from white officers from Rhodesia who wanted to keep guerrilla forces from trying to overthrow the Rhodesian government. The pool of recruits included former police and armed forces members along with dissidents from FRELIMO, who were sent to camps to be re-doctrinated into FRELIMO's ideology after the struggle for independence with Portugal.

The RENAMO received strong support from the South African military, receiving training and the use of bases in the south, bordering both nations. The RENAMO was against the FRELIMO-led, self-proclaimed Marxist government and used guerrilla tactics such as disrupting the economy by cutting power lines, destroying the nation's transportation infrastructure, and securing the energy deposits. The RENAMO were ruthless with respect to massacring whole towns and villages, proving their guerrilla forces were very successful at terrorizing the population. In the late 1980s, conservative estimates showed that nearly 100,000 died while nearly one million were displaced from their homes or fled the country to become refugees in neighboring countries.

Mozambique's civil war continued to rage until a peace accord was signed between the RENAMO rebels and the Mozambique government on October 4, 1992.¹¹⁹

B. FROM IMPLEMENTING PEACE ACCORDS TO RENEWED CIVIL WAR

At the time the peace accords were signed, effectively ending the civil war, Mozambique had achieved remarkable progress with its implementation of the negotiated settlement. The nation successfully transitioned from war to an enduring peace that lasted for about 20 years. “The sustained political stability; transformed its political and economic system from one-party state to a constitutional democracy; and moved from a socialist centrally-planned economy to a market-based system.”¹²⁰ The following sections of this chapter outline how Mozambique successfully implemented its peace accords and analyze the negative factors of an unstable peace that have motivated a renewal of hostilities from RENAMO toward the FRELIMO majority government. The following section provides greater understanding of Mozambique’s achievement of peace from a negotiated settlement. In Mozambique, there is a clear example of a negotiated peace settlement. The nation was able to end the fighting and adopt a formal agreement to move towards peace.

1. Mozambique’s Transition to Keeping the Peace

The path Mozambique took to keep the peace follows a similar one that other nations have taken. As seen in the previous case study, the following sections analyze the process from the peace accords, which involves disarming, demobilizing, and reintegration of combatant troops, SSR, setting up transitional governing apparatuses, and conducting free and fair elections, along with implementing negotiated settlement objectives. The section addresses how Mozambique chose to implement the peace and begins to answer questions about why there is a resurgence of hostilities.

¹¹⁹ “Salvaging Peace in Mozambique,” *Christian Science Monitor*, July 9, 1993, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/291211109?accountid=12702>.

¹²⁰ Alejandra Kubitschek, “Mozambique in Transition and the Future Role of the UN,” Center on International Cooperation, August, 2013, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/bujones_mozambique_study.pdf.

2. Mozambique's Implementation of its Peace Accords

The University of Notre Dame's Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies has placed Mozambique at an overall completion rate for implementing their accords, since inception, at 92 percent.¹²¹ Although Mozambique had many setbacks implementing the Rome General Peace Accords from 1992, the peace in Mozambique advanced considerably, when taking into account the long period of relative peace and the establishment of democratic institutions. The renewal of hostilities questions conventional accepted approaches to peacebuilding and underscores the fact that a successful plan implemented after one civil war may not derive universally successful results. However, the following sections look briefly at Mozambique's experience with the reforms, which are a testament to the liberal approach of peacebuilding including DDR, SSR, and changes to governance.

a. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

The disarmament program specified in the peace agreements called for “weapons collection and destruction, one of the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (UNOMOZ), which was established in October 1992.”¹²² Since, the DDR process was not ready to be executed soon after the peace accords, weapons from guerrilla forces were not collected or destroyed soon after demobilization. Although the mandate was realized in 1994, it was too late to ensure full effectiveness:

UNOMOZ collected a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which belonged to paramilitary forces (out of a projected total of 49,806). This was significantly less than the amount of weapons which were known to be in Mozambique. Because of delays in the demobilization process, UNOMOZ was unable to complete the verification of weapons before the expiration of its mandate. Many of the weapons which were collected at

¹²¹ “General Peace Agreement for Mozambique,” University of Notre Dame, accessed October 16, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

¹²² “Cease Fire: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique,” University of Notre Dame, accessed October 17, 2016 <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/cease-fire-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

the assembly areas were of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process.¹²³

The plan called for demobilization and integration to happen over a six-month period at which point there would be elections. However, the UN's special envoy promised if there was a delay in the former, there would also be one with the elections. "We would not vote with arms," he declared.¹²⁴ The UN special envoy, Dr. Aldo Ajello, along with 6,500 troops and military observers were deployed in a support role. In the following year, "the UN mission in Mozambique identified 49 assembly points where soldiers from both sides would be confined, 29 for government troops and 20 for RENAMO."¹²⁵ The demobilization of rebel fighters began in 1994, with almost "75,000-strong government army and the 20,000 rebels. A new army of 30,000 men was to be created in their place, with fighters drawn equally from each side,"¹²⁶ and "10,000 of which ONUMOZ helped integrate into the new national army."¹²⁷ Despite relative success, the ONUMOZ experienced a host of issues including: "Timetables slipped, the local parties delayed compliance, budgets soared, parent UN agencies engaged in obstructionism, and UN resources on the ground [and especially the civilian police] were underutilized and worse."¹²⁸ Former combatants, lacked personal security as they no longer possessed weapons, and because of their diminished status within the assembly camps, they became unruly, attacking UN officials, taking locals hostage, and engaging in other nefarious activities.

123 Peter Batchelor, "Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa," in *Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa*, ed. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, (New York: United Nations Publications, 1996), 71.
<http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/disarmament-and-conflict-resolution-project-small-arms-management-and-peacekeeping-in-southern-africa-137.pdf>.

124 "Refugees: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique," University of Notre Dame, accessed October 17, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/refugees-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

125 "Demobilization: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique," University of Notre Dame, accessed October 17, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/demobilization-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

126 Ibid.

127 Mozambique: UNOMUZ Background," United Nations, accessed October 19, 2016,
<http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/onumozS.htm>.

128 Igor Bulgakov, "The Ukrainian Armed Forces in Peacekeeping: New Perspectives on The Professionalization of Peacekeeping force" (master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate school, 2002).

The final UN report showed sweeping success despite the odds, dated December 1994, with a “total of 91,691 (67,042 government and 24,649 RENAMO) soldiers had been registered by ONUMOZ. Some 78,078 soldiers (57,540 government and 20,538 RENAMO) were demobilized, while some of the remainder joined the new army.”¹²⁹ The DDR process in Mozambique fundamentally changed the power structure. The assembly and demobilization of members of the RENAMO put an end to the hostile situation. RENAMO chose not to resume the conflict; the demobilization of ex-combatants was a success.

b. Security Sector Reform

Security matters to the poor and other vulnerable groups, especially women and children, because bad policing, weak justice and penal systems and corrupt militaries mean that they suffer disproportionately from crime, insecurity and fear they are consequently less likely to be able to access government services.¹³⁰ Again the importance of emphasizing SSR is an absolute necessity for any nation to make the transition from civil war to sustained peace; otherwise, renewed armed conflict may persist. It is widely accepted that security sector institutions include the military, police forces, border security, customs officials, and correctional facilities. The security sector can more broadly include the judicial sector, which will oversee the prosecution of human rights and misuse of force. For purposes of this study, the two main institutions to implement reforms after conflict include the military and police forces.

c. Military Reform

Mozambique’s peace agreement mandated that government and RENAMO forces merge the military and guerrilla forces in equal numbers to establish a new 30,000 strong

¹²⁹ “Demobilization: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique,” University of Notre Dame, accessed October 17, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/demobilization-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

¹³⁰ *Security Sector Reform and Governance*, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (Paris, France: OECD Publishing, 2005), <https://www.oecd.org/dac/governance-peace/conflictfragilityandresilience/docs/31785288.pdf>.

military.¹³¹ The new senior level headquarters of the joint military would also be a combination of members from both warring parties. Although the DDR was slow, the new power sharing over the military was almost completely implemented during the five years that followed the peace agreement.

The FRELIMO government was accepting of the integration between both parties into the newly created Armed Forces of Mozambique (FADM). The agreement mandated that the troop strength, would be “30,000 (24,000 army, 4,000 air force, and 2,000 navy).”¹³² The previous military establishment was disbanded and replaced by the new military in 1994. The high command consisted of generals, with one from each group, and this joint structure was mirrored throughout all echelons of the military.

Despite what the peace agreement may have stipulated, the government and RENAMO troops were not equal, and many decided not to continue with the military but rather chose the life of a civilian. “On Aug. 24 President Joaquim Chissano, who had himself been demobilized as a general in the FPLM [People’s Forces of Liberation or Mozambique] on Aug. 12, reported that the new FADM would have only 11,000 of its intended 30,000 members operational by the elections in October.”¹³³

d. Police Reform

As Malan describes, the “Police of the Republic of Mozambique (PRM) was created on 31 December 1992 by Law 19/92, to replace the existing Mozambique People’s Police (PPM).”¹³⁴ In 1994, the UN Civilian Police Component (CIVPOL) was

¹³¹ Adriano Malache, Paulino Macaringue and Joao Borges, “Profound Transformations and Regional Conflagrations: The History of Mozambique’s Armed Forces from 1975–2005,” in *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in South Africa*, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 158.

¹³² Mark Knight, “Security Sector Reform: Post-Conflict Integration,” Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform, August, 2009, 32, http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/5064~v~Security_Sector_Reform__Post-Conflict_Integration.pdf

¹³³ “Military Reform: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique,” University of Notre Dame, accessed October 17, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/military-reform-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

¹³⁴ Mark Malan, “Peacebuilding in Southern Africa: Police Reform in Mozambique and South Africa,” *International Peacekeeping* 6, no. 4 (1999): 172, DOI:10.1080/13533319908413804.

deployed in support of its existing mission to monitor Mozambique's transition to a more integrated national police force. The element sent to observe policing activities was to ensure that the peace agreement gave some reassurance to the RENAMO, so civil rights and liberties were being upheld. The integration of RENAMO into the national police forces experienced issues such as inadequate training, a lack of screening criteria for new hires, and corrupt practices. The police grew "from an estimated 18,000 in 1994 to more than 21,000 in 1998."¹³⁵ Additionally, the CIVPOL supported the UN Mission to monitor the electoral elections and verify rights of citizens were respected, beginning with the elections in September 1994.¹³⁶ The security sector of Mozambique was in disarray; therefore, international support was higher than in other post-conflict nations such as Angola. The international involvement helped with building a quasi-integrated military and police force. For both the military and police forces, the DDR process was defined by the peace agreement, international support, buyouts, and the daunting prospects that were not attractive to former rebels.

C. MOVE TO A MORE INCLUSIVE GOVERNMENT

For Mozambique, the DDR process was a benchmark to be achieved prior to hosting democratically open and free elections. After UN observers were satisfied with the progress, the next step was toward Presidential and legislative elections, which took place October 1994.¹³⁷

On the eve of the elections, the RENAMO announced its withdrawal from the poll. RENAMO decided to participate only after the intervention of the international community, including a message from the President of the Security Council; the active involvement of the Secretary-General in international efforts; as well as guarantees by

¹³⁵ Knight, "Security sector reform," 33.

¹³⁶ "Police Reform: General Peace Agreement for Mozambique," University of Notre Dame, accessed October 18, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/provision/police-reform-general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

¹³⁷ "Presidential, Legislative, and Provincial Assembly Election in Mozambique," The Carter Center, October, 2014, 16, https://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/mozambique-finalrpt-061616.pdf.

ONUMOZ and the international members of the CSC that the electoral process would be closely monitored.¹³⁸

The hesitation by RENAMO demonstrated a level of mistrust of the election system and gave the appearance that it was averse to participation until after assurances were given by outside agencies. The election results included “Mr. Chissano, received 2,633,740 votes, amounting to 53.3 per cent of those cast in the presidential election. The leader of RENAMO, Mr. Afonso Macacho Marceta Dhlakama, received 1,666,965 votes, or 33.7 per cent.”¹³⁹ In the legislative election, “FRELIMO received the largest share of the new Parliament’s 250 seats: FRELIMO—129, RENAMO—109, and UD—12.”¹⁴⁰ The elections appeared to be inclusive, but fair and equal power sharing within the government is one of the grievances most often voiced by RENAMO, which can be observed to date.

D. MOZAMBIQUE FACTORS FOR RECURRENCE

Peace is over in the country ... The responsibility lies with the Frelimo government because they didn’t want to listen to Renamo’s grievances.

—Fernando Mazanga¹⁴¹

The negative factors that spark the recurrence of civil war are defined in Chapter II as political exclusion, coercion, ethnic discrimination, economic grievances, weak states, greed, and destruction from the previous civil war. Each of these factors is drawn from theories by current academics and application of our case study analysis. While the authors consider the factors to be key motivators to renewed civil war, not all nations have experienced the same factors.

As the following quotation demonstrates, the strong implementation of the peace accords has eroded, and since 2012, Mozambique has engaged in a renewed conflict:

¹³⁸ “General Peace Agreement for Mozambique,” University of Notre Dame, accessed October 20, 2016, <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/general-peace-agreement-mozambique>.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Manuel Macuro, “Mozambique Faces Uncertainty as Renamo Ends 1992 Peace Pact,” *Reuters*, October 21, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-renamo-idUSBRE99K0LI20131021>.

To force the ruling party to change the electoral legislation and accommodate some of its remaining and, according to Renamo, “unfairly demobilized,” troops into the national army and police forces. The electoral legislation was duly amended to accommodate most of Renamo’s demands. However, the talks on the incorporation of Renamo’s forces and particularly on its format have stalled completely. While Renamo insists that re(integration) must allow its forces to occupy positions within all ranks (including high ranking ones) of the army and the national police force, the government wants Renamo to first provide it with a breakdown of its military personnel before discussion can recommence.¹⁴²

The most divisive issue that could push the current low-level insurgency back into a complete civil war is RENAMO’s demand to lay claim to specific territory, based on recent national elections. RENAMO’s argument is that the provinces in which they received “a majority of votes in the 2014 general election (Sofala, Manica, Tete, Nampula and Zambézia) be turned into autonomous territories under its rule.”¹⁴³ A contested issue is whether Mozambique has free, fair, and transparent elections. In April 2015, RENAMO claimed the electoral process was rigged and gave the election to the establishment without receiving a fair chance at winning. The following negative factors address the sudden divisional shift away from unification and peacebuilding.

1. Political Exclusion

RENAMO stated it’s “annulling its 1992 peace agreement with the ruling FRELIMO, following the capture of one of its bases by government forces.”¹⁴⁴ Since the 1992 peace agreement was signed, the post-conflict political sphere has been dominated by FRELIMO, which has won a majority of votes in almost every election since. The margin of wins is incrementally growing, “President Armando Guebuza’s administration, from 2004 to 2014, with Guebuza winning 75 percent of the votes and Frelimo gaining

¹⁴² Fredson Guilengue, “What Lies behind Mozambique’s Renewed Crisis?,” *World Weekly*, November 5, 2015, <http://www.theworldweekly.com/reader/view/magazine/2015-11-05/what-lies-behind-mozambiques-renewed-crisis/5501>.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁴⁴ “Mozambique’s Renamo Says Ending 1992 Peace Agreement with Frelimo Government,” *Reuters*, October 21, 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mozambique-renamo-statement-idUSBRE99K0T020131021?mod=related&channelName=worldNews>.

191 of 250 parliamentary seats.”¹⁴⁵ Since the initial elections, RENAMO has tried bargaining with the government to supplement the results to increase inclusive political power. This form of increasing political inclusion has never really changed the outcome of the elections, but it has reinforced RENAMO’s respect for the outcome and prevented hostilities. This practice diminished under President Guebuza, who was not sympathetic and became more aggressive as the ruling party.

FRELIMO has dominated the political system in Mozambique, preventing greater political inclusion. Since RENAMO has not been fortunate at the voting booth, the FRELIMO no longer views them as a formidable partner for continued peace or an adversary that poses a real threat. The RENAMO has struck back at FRELIMO with a low-scale armed force, launching a resurgence with the use of attacks in 2013. This and subsequent acts demonstrate that a segment of the population still feels excluded and is now willing to gain political rights once again through the use of force as a means to regain those rights.

RENAMO has been communicating their message of exclusion, which has garnered support mainly among younger voters. Dhlakama’s choice to renew hostilities in 2013 is not accepted by the generation that lived through the civil war, but the youth are more open to the use of force for greater political inclusion. The current recurrence in hostilities centers on issues dealing with RENAMO’s grievance related to needing greater political inclusion and for national unification. Although Mozambique’s civil war is complete, the peace accord signed and implemented makes it obvious that a portion of the population does not feel that commitments and guarantees under the provisions of the peace accord have improved. This is the case with RENAMO; they feel denied political inclusion and now want to separate from the mostly FRELIMO-led government.

¹⁴⁵ Carrie Manning, “Conflict Fears Fade in Mozambique, but Renamo’s Demands Do Not,” *World Politics Review*, October 21, 2016, <http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/15846/conflict-fears-fade-in-mozambique-but-renamo-s-demands-do-not>.

2. Coercion

When the conflict ended in Mozambique, the DDR process took some time before implementing, and as previously noted, the number of weapons collected did not equal what was left behind from the civil war. The Mozambique Civil war ended with a negotiated peace settlement; however, the RENAMO leader retained a security detail of over 150 rebels, due to the lack of trust in placing his security in the hands of the government. Additionally, RENAMO retained some of its military facilities. Therefore, trust is a vital element.

During and after the civil war, the government has been primarily occupied with promoting a notion of “national unity”—to the point of silencing opposition. A prominent example is the 2015 murder of the constitutional law professor Gilles Cistac. He had defended the constitutional viability of Renamo’s proposition of autonomous provinces—a serious challenge to Frelimo’s national unity refrain. (There is no evidence Cistac was killed by Frelimo sympathizers, but analysts have cited his opinions on provincial autonomy as the likely cause of his murder.¹⁴⁶

The situation is one of coercing and silencing the opposition, all in the name of “national unity.” Mozambique keeps the façade to attract and keep international support or aid.

3. Ethnic Discrimination

Mozambique was not a civil war motivated by ethnic divisions. Rather the warring parties’ wanted inclusive political power and economic opportunities. RENAMO, which hoped to usurp FRELIMO’s control, was established by white Rhodesians outside of Mozambique to destabilize the FRELIMO government and stop the spread of communism. RENAMO was then given to the apartheid regime in South Africa as its main supporter after the demise of Rhodesia.

¹⁴⁶ Corinna Jentzsch, “Here Are 4 Reasons Why Mozambique Isn’t a Post-War Success Story, *Washington Post*, February 2, 2016. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/02/heres-four-reasons-why-we-should-question-mozambiques-post-conflict-success-story-narrative/>.

4. Economic Grievances

Prior to Mozambique's civil war, the economic situation was different from the one in neighboring Angola. Early on both warring parties, FRELIMO and RENAMO, lacked sufficient funding to sustain the war for are two main reasons. First, Mozambique's natural resources were not yet explored or exploited to their fullest potential. Secondly, at the time of independence, Mozambique was considered one of the least developed industrial producers in Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, both warring parties targeted each other's ability to develop the necessary resources. RENAMO placed pressure on the economy by targeting agricultural and industrial sectors, along with logistical routes used by FRELIMO. FRELIMO was successful at taking over RENAMO's economic sectors in central Mozambique. Thus, the economic situation toward the end of the civil war in Mozambique grew bleak. In the early 1990s, prior to the negotiated settlement, mass starvation from drought forced the two parties to collaborate. The FRELIMO regime reached an agreement for transport of food into RENAMO held areas, demonstrating a unifying need. The gross national product (GNP) is often a measure of the economic health of a nation:

The GNP per capita had dropped dramatically from U.S. \$270 in 1985 to U.S. \$170 in 1986. Another landslide drop occurred between 1986 and 1987, when it further decreased to U.S. \$80. After it had remained at approximately the same level from 1987 to 1991, it fell to a dramatic low of U.S. \$65 in 1992.¹⁴⁷

The domestic economy gradually eroded toward the end of the civil war and served as a major catalyst for the eventual agreement for a negotiated settlement. Due to the adverse development of the economy and continued fighting, as well as inadequate distribution of resources, Mozambique has again found itself stumbling back into hostilities. As RENAMO's leadership feels inclusionary policies are eroding, it uses that narrative as a recruitment tool to motivate Mozambique's disenfranchised citizens and to rebuild RENAMO's military wing.

¹⁴⁷ Markus Kornprobst, "Explaining Success and Failure of War to Peace Transitions: Revisiting the Angolan and Mozambican Experience," *Journal of Conflict Studies* 22, no. 2 (2002), <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/393/630>.

A recent World Bank report on the economic situation in Mozambique noted that “the main findings are that as a result of strong growth in incomes in the agricultural sector as well as the non-agricultural sector, poverty declined rapidly in Mozambique over the 96/97–02/03 period in rural areas and in most urban areas.”¹⁴⁸ However, “despite this good progress, more than 50% of the population remains in poverty today.”¹⁴⁹ Furthermore, many of the citizens lack safe water and adequate housing, making it difficult to change the situation for over half of the population. If Mozambique citizens cannot meet their basic needs, they will easily be motivated to participate in armed conflict.

5. Weak States

Mozambique’s majority-led government by FRELIMO does not have adequate control over all the provinces within its sovereign borders. This can be observed from RENAMO’s desire to take control of those provinces entirely. As reported by *International Business Times* on March 21, 2016, the leader of RENAMO stated, “Dhlakama, meanwhile, has time and again shown his intentions of taking over the six central and northern provinces he says should be under Renamo control—Tete, Manica, Sofala, Zambezia, Nampula and Niassa.”¹⁵⁰ This was reiterated by a RENAMO Member of Parliament, Jose Mantiegas, who said that “the guerrilla group would at least start to govern in six provinces this month, as promised.” The demands by RENAMO are due to the perception that the government has failed to honor key mandates of the 1992 peace accord, including properly integrating RENAMO combatants into Mozambique’s military.

¹⁴⁸ Louise Fox, Elena Bardasi, and Kathleen Van den Broeck, “Poverty in Mozambique: Unraveling Changes and Determinants,” World Bank, August 2005, <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/920641468053686776/pdf/342480PAPER0MOZ0Poverty0AFRwp87.pdf>.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Elsa Buchanan, “Mozambique: Will Renamo Take Over Provinces Amid Rising Violence and Mediator Presence?,” *International Business Times*, March 21, 2016, <http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/mozambique-will-renamo-take-over-provinces-amid-rising-violence-mediator-presence-1550704#>.

The FRELIMO majority government has tried to heed some of RENAMO's demands by making changes to the electoral process to ensure greater transparency in election administration. It has agreed to come to the table to discuss renewed SSR and the integration of Dhlakama's security forces, but it has not been successful in reaching such a deal. Since no tangible concessions have been made by the government, Dhlakama continues to try to appoint officials in provinces where the group has won a majority. The rationale that RENAMO has for additional attacks is beginning to gain favor among its constituency, if the issues of self-governance and fair integration into the military and police forces are not properly addressed. RENAMO is arguing that because it has won a majority it should have complete control over those provinces. Last, considering RENAMO's presence is more concentrated in certain parts of the country than FRELIMO's, RENAMO's legitimacy among populations in those areas is strong.

6. Greed of FRELIMO

In the post-conflict period, while Mozambique implemented its peace agreement, with the help of international support, previously untapped natural resource wealth has been discovered. As political power has become more concentrated in the hands of the FRELIMO, so has economic wealth. Now, the economic payoff of political inclusion, including access to the Mozambique's natural resource expansion, has increased. Mozambique's reserves of natural resources have been confirmed, but production has yet to fully take hold with some of the region's most significant untapped natural gas and coal deposits.

Dhlakama claimed the FRELIMO did not distribute equally returns from discovered natural resources.¹⁵¹ In fact, an International Monetary Fund report confirms that income inequality in Mozambique has continuously increased, despite strong economic growth.¹⁵² Additionally, the geography of Mozambique demonstrates the

¹⁵¹Corinna Jentzsch, "Here Are 4 Reasons Why Mozambique Isn't a Post-war Success Story," *Washington Post*, February 2, 2016, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/02/02/There-are-four-reasons-why-we-should-question-mozambiques-post-conflict-success-story-narrative/>.

¹⁵²"Republic of Mozambique Selected Issues," International Monetary Fund, January 2016, <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2016/cr1610.pdf>.

inequality in the central-northern parts of Mozambique, where RENAMO holds a strong level of influence. There has been unrest related to the extreme income inequality in Mozambique:

Riots in 1995, 2008, 2010, and 2012 related to increased food and transport prices show the youth's frustration over access to resources and political power. The youth participating in these riots did not experience the suffering of the civil war—a reason why older Mozambicans expressed concern in conversations with me that war may return. Recent reports of young armed men at Renamo rallies have contributed to the fear that Renamo may be able to recruit the young and discontented.¹⁵³

The recent unrest and income inequality could point to practices stemming from greed by the majority-led government. The unequal distribution of the GDP from the resources of the nation has generated several conflicts. The accusations by Dhlakama are highlighting the imbalances in political power and unequal distribution of resources. Thus, in the post-conflict period the nation is proving less economically beneficial to those under RENAMO control, which could spark a new civil war.

7. Destruction from the Previous Civil War

The civil war in Mozambique gradually degraded the economy and caused major destruction to physical property, especially in rural areas. During the post-peace settlement period, many internally displaced citizens returned to their homes and initiated reconstruction efforts. During this period, almost all economic factors improved; however, reconstructing the physical infrastructure of the nation fell short of supporting common citizens. The level of affluence improved for all citizens slightly; however, Mozambique remains one of the poorest nations in Africa. The rural economy to date has the capacity to grow substantially with proper reforms and policies to lift rural households out of the trap of poverty and subsistence farming. The rural economy has never fully recovered. The stronghold of RENAMO supporters primarily resides in areas that have not recovered from the civil war or have not had substantial improvement. The feeling of exclusion in these areas is real, not perceived, and is used to continue the polarization of the country. The aftermath of the civil war had over one million dead from

¹⁵³ Jentzsch, "Here Are 4 Reasons Why Mozambique Isn't a Post-war Success Story."

fighting and starvation, along with many more displaced from their homes.¹⁵⁴ Finally, the reconciliation process is forgotten by the youth of Mozambique and the mistrust and insecurity of the older generation make the recent acts of aggression a foreshadowing of a possible return to war.

E. CONCLUSION

Mozambique's internal security situation is volatile. The armed wing of RENAMO is fighting with government security forces, while RENAMO training bases were recently seized and prominent leaders killed. There is no formal agreement to end hostilities. The thin line between small internal conflict and a full-scale civil war is becoming more blurred. After more than 20 years of a relatively durable peace, it would seem many of the issues rooted in the original civil war were addressed. However, since the peace agreement and implementation of its mandates, both uneven political and economic inclusion of RENAMO have eroded slowly. The majority party is marginalizing the RENAMO party and its supporters. The authors hope that the case study presented has given a thorough analysis of Mozambique's transition from civil war to sustained peace to renewed conflict. The specific factors outlined in the case study give examples of what has ultimately led to renewed internal conflict in Mozambique.

¹⁵⁴ "Mozambique: History," Yale Jackson Institute for Global Affairs, accessed November 3, 2016, <http://nexus.som.yale.edu/jackson-mmm/?q=node/102>.

V. PEACE ATTEMPTS IN COLOMBIA

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is the oldest terrorist group in Latin America and has been the cause for much of the bloodshed that has plagued Colombia. President Uribe's Government, from 2002 to 2010, adopted a counter-terrorism strategy combined with U.S. military support for the war against drugs and terrorism. During the protracted conflict of nearly seven years, the Colombian military has reduced the FARC's force of nearly 20,000 armed combatants to one with barely 8,000. On August 7, 2010, while campaigning for his first term in office, President Santos promised to continue the counter-terrorism strategy led by his predecessor, President Alvaro Uribe Velez, to defeat the FARC militarily. However, Santos shifted on this campaign promise and decided not to continue with Uribe's hard line approach. Instead, he decided to end the conflict through a negotiated settlement. Therefore, President Santos, like Colombian presidents of the 1980s and 1990s has decided to gamble on negotiation as part of his strategy to end more than 50 years of war in Colombia. The Colombian government of Juan Manuel Santos has reached a preliminary peace agreement in Havana, Cuba, with the FARC.

The first part of this chapter provides a historic chronology of Colombian administrations since the 1950s, which have been negotiating with internal insurgents and terrorist groups. The second part of this chapter analyzes why President Santos decided to negotiate with the FARC instead of continuing the strategy of defeating the group militarily. It is a high-risk approach; according to Hirotaka Ohmura, "Military victory is more likely to lead to stable peace than a negotiated peace settlement, because through victory the balance of power becomes imbalanced between the parties involved."¹⁵⁵

A. MORE THAN 60 YEARS OF ENDEAVORS TO ACHIEVE PEACE

The country and population of Colombia have a desire and an imperative need to shift from a protracted conflict to lasting peace. Colombia is characterized as having the

¹⁵⁵ Ohmura, "Termination and Recurrence of Civil War," 378.

longest lasting armed insurgency in Latin America, with multiple attempts at negotiating with insurgent groups in order to achieve peace. The history of Colombia's conflicts and peace processes have their origin in the second half of the 20th century, when a series of events marked the beginning of a period known simply as "La Violencia." On April 9, 1948, in the midst of the struggle between the main Colombian liberal and conservative political parties, the liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, who was running for the presidency, was assassinated.¹⁵⁶

The assassination of Gaitan unleashed an unprecedented level of violence both in the countryside and in the cities, leading to the formation of peasant led self-defense groups and liberal and communist guerrillas. The aforementioned groups were created in order to protect themselves from the police, who had been politicized, and therefore supported the conservative party ruling the country at that time. Ricardo Arias, a Colombian historian, describes the impact of Gaitan's assassination: "On April 9, 1948, more than a temporary disruption of peace, it represented the beginning of a profound social disintegration, the collapse of the traditional order."¹⁵⁷ "La Violencia" period between 1948 and 1958 was one of the bloodiest periods in Colombian history,¹⁵⁸ characterized by assassinations, assaults, harassment, destruction of private property, terrorism, and citizens being victimized based on their political affiliation.

In 1953, General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed the presidency after a nonviolent coup d'etat and produced the first attempt at peace during his tenure. General Rojas proposed amnesty for the different groups created during "La Violencia," but this amnesty was limited to disarmament and demobilization. In reality, however the amnesty did not provide any kind of reintegration process into civilian life for several hundred liberal Colombian guerrillas. Despite Rojas' effort, the possibility for peace vanished

¹⁵⁶ Henry Mance, "Colombia Marks a Deadly Date," BBC, April 9, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7334165.stm>.

¹⁵⁷ Ricardo Arias, "Los Sucesos del 9 de Abril de 1948 como Legitimadores de la Violencia Oficial," [The Events of April 9, 1948, as Legitimizing the Official Violence] *Historia Crítica* 17, (July–December, 1998): 41. <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=81111329003>.

¹⁵⁸ David Bushnell, "Historical Setting," In *Colombia: A Country Study*, ed. Rex Hudson (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010) 43.

because the government was not able to provide security for those demobilized, many of whom were murdered.¹⁵⁹

Security is the most important factor in ensuring the non-recurrence of hostilities. Dirk Salomons, Director of the Humanitarian Policy Track at the School of International Public Affairs at Columbia University, reaffirms the importance of security: “The basic need for freedom from violence is an absolute prerequisite for any effective post-conflict recovery process. After, armed conflict subsides, if there is no prospect of security; then, there is no hope for a common future.”¹⁶⁰ The Colombian government could not provide enough guarantees of security, due to a lack of effective presence in some regions of the country. Therefore, the government’s incapacity enabled the emergence of new armed groups, influenced by communist doctrine.

In 1958, the decade-old conflict ended with a bipartisan pact called the “National Front,” lasting to 1974.¹⁶¹ The “National Front” is considered to be the second attempt at delivering peace to Colombia. During the period of the “National Front,” the conservative and liberal political parties agreed to share power for a 16-year period, in which every four years the presidency would alternate between the parties. At that time, the political agreement completely excluded the existing Communist Party in Colombia, which became one of the reasons for the FARC’s initial struggle against the government. Ricardo Arias, explains the “National Front” by affirming:

The National Front was mainly designed to end the old two-party conflicts. From that point of view, it was a complete success: In the mid-sixties, liberals and conservatives no longer settled their differences through violent attacks. However, the National Front failed to actually convene the nation as a whole. Very quickly, an increasingly numerous and radical opposition felt that the agreement had neglected the interests

¹⁵⁹ “Intentos de paz en Colombia,” [Peace Attempts in Colombia] *El Espectador*, March, 25, 2012, <http://www.elespectador.com/publicaciones/especial/intentos-de-paz-colombia-articulo-334224>

¹⁶⁰ Dirk Salomons, “Security an Absolute Requisite,” in *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, ed. Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 57.

¹⁶¹ “El Frente Nacional,” [The National Front] Banco de la Republica, accessed August 24, 2016, http://www.banrepultural.org/blaavirtual/ayudadetareas/politica/el_frente_nacional.

of other sectors. The emergence of several guerrilla movements was proof of that.¹⁶²

The exclusive nature of the “National Front” and struggles over land ownership caused the emergence of the main guerrilla groups in Colombia known as the FARC, the ELN, EPL, and the M-19.¹⁶³

The FARC was formed in Colombia in May 1964, due to a multitude of factors. One of these factors was the turmoil that existed in Latin America after the Cuban revolution, and the desire of communist organizations to achieve the same results obtained by Fidel Castro and his “revolutionary comrades” on the Caribbean island. Hal Brands underscores this turmoil in his book *Latin America’s Cold War*: “Castro’s revolt reverberated strongly within Latin America, insurgencies informed by domestic grievances and energized by the Cuban example waged destructive campaigns throughout Central America and South America.”¹⁶⁴ A supporting factor for new recruits to the FARC was the high level of poverty and inequality seen mainly in rural areas of Colombia during the 1960s. Therefore, the FARC had the perfect reason to adopt Marxist—Maoist ideology of “popular warfare based on the concept of class struggle”¹⁶⁵ in Colombia. It relied on farmers to try to achieve its main objective: “Overthrow the government, and establish a communist regime.” In his book, *FARC the Longest Insurgency*, Gary Leech describes FARC and its root cause: “Guerrilla forces operated in isolated parts of rural Colombia where they sought to exploit appalling local poverty and the inability or unwillingness of the governments to address the basic needs of a long suffering population.”¹⁶⁶ The FARC clearly understood how to leverage and manipulate the population’s misfortunes, making the population believe that only through acts of

¹⁶² Ricardo Arias, *Historia de Colombia Contemporánea* [Contemporary History of Colombia] (Bogota, Colombia: Universidad de los Andes, 2011), 17. <https://sinismos.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/ricardoarias-colombiaccont.pdf>.

¹⁶³ Ricardo Vargas, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and The Illicit Drug Trade,” Transnational Institute, June 7, 1999, <https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/revolutionary-armed-forces-colombia-farc-and-illicit-drug-trade>.

¹⁶⁴ Hal Brands, *Latin America’s Cold War* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 3.

¹⁶⁵ Ciment, *Encyclopedia of Conflicts*, 7.

¹⁶⁶ Garry Leech, *The FARC: The Longest Insurgency* (New York: Fernwood Pub, 2011), 18.

terrorism would they achieve their objectives. According to the FARC, terrorism was the key to achieving better living conditions. The FARC used the peasants' grievances over land re-distribution as another motivational issue to support their cause.

The environment of economic insecurity in Colombia during the 1960s supported the mobilization of the peasant population to act, making recruitment efforts by the FARC easy. The Colombian economy during this period was in a deplorable situation, with poverty concentrated in the rural areas. In addition, an extreme inequality of land distribution existed: "In 1960, a mere one percent of landowners owned 55 percent of Colombia's arable land, while 62.5 percent of the country's farmers subsisted with less than 1 percent of the national territory suitable for agriculture."¹⁶⁷ For example, poverty in rural areas was 72 percent, in 1985, while in urban areas 32 percent.¹⁶⁸ These statistics show the problems of the Colombian economy, which the FARC recognized as an opportunity to justify terrorist activities and attempts to overthrow the government. The FARC used terrorist acts to force the government to succumb to negotiation.

Since the early 1980s, Colombian presidents have tried some form of negotiation with the different terrorist groups that commit crimes, making the practice common enough that it is considered an unwritten norm. Follow-on presidential administrations have assumed they have a moral obligation to seek a peaceful solution to the violence that has faced their country. Therefore, they have all considered a negotiated agreement as the preferred method to achieve peace. Mitchell Reiss, former U.S. Special Envoy to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, explains why government officials decide to negotiate with insurgents or terrorists, "The moral taint of dealing with terrorists, which none denied, was outweighed by the chance to end violence and achieve the greatest good for the greatest number of people."¹⁶⁹ However, as soon as the terrorists start to negotiate, they do not have an incentive to find a solution; rather in the interest of time,

¹⁶⁷ Leech, *The FARC The Longest Insurgency*, 19.

¹⁶⁸ Carlos De roux, Pobreza e Indigencia, [Poverty and Indigence], accessed April 30, 2016, <http://www.carlosvicentederoux.org/apc-aa-files/b3103a6119a79c0bec1c7e4eb88dc340/Pobreza%20e%20indigencia.doc>.

¹⁶⁹ Mitchell Reiss, *Negotiating with Evil: When to Talk to Terrorists* (New York: Open Road Media, 2010), 244.

the longer the duration of a negotiation, the more time available to reorganize and accommodate a new strategy. Reiss argues, “Governments usually expend a good deal of time, a great deal of effort, and the investment of significant political capital to bring a terrorist group to the negotiation table in the first place.”¹⁷⁰ A presidential term in Colombia lasts four years and this usually works in favor of the insurgents or terrorist groups and not the government. The Colombian government’s institutional time constraint forces the government to provide generous concessions to insurgents and terrorists in order to persuade them to negotiate and reach an agreement.

During former President Belisario Betancourt’s administration (1982–1986) talks were initiated with the FARC and ELN.¹⁷¹ In March 1984, the first ceasefire agreement with the FARC was reached. The government pledged to establish guarantees for the FARC to participate in politics and to unify as a political party, called the “Union Patriótica.” The party comprised communists, indigenous people, students, unions, and ex-combatants. However, the government’s inability to provide security for the combatants played against the probability of a final agreement. A few years after the creation of the “Union Patriótica” party, it would be literally exterminated by more than 2,300 militant deaths.¹⁷² Betancourt’s peace process with the FARC and ELN led to the release of terrorists and insurgents from prison, without requiring any commitment from those groups.¹⁷³ The FARC and ELN exploited these concessions, by redesigning their strategy and reorganizing their forces, in order to continue with their goal of overthrowing the government.

The efforts of President Betancourt to move Colombia toward peace failed. However, Betancourt’s government should be recognized for its change in approach toward political speech. There were two elements introduced into the national discourse

¹⁷⁰ Reiss, *Negotiating with Evil*, 241.

¹⁷¹ Harvey Kline, *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian president Andres Pastrana* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2007), 17.

¹⁷² “Por que Reparar a la Union Patriótica,” [Why Repairs the Patriot Union] *Revista Semana*, April 6, 2013, <http://www.semana.com/nacion/articulo/por-que-reparar-union-patriotica/338971-3>.

¹⁷³ Ricardo Arias, “La Jerarquía Eclesiástica Colombiana y el Proceso de Paz de Belisario Betancourt (1982–1986)” [The Colombian Church Hierarchy and Belisario Betancourt’s Peace Process] *Historia Crítica*, no 8 (July–December 1993), <https://historiacritica.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/141/1.php>.

on the matter: First, acknowledgement that all armed rebel groups were political actors gave them a voice to open dialogue. Second, Colombia, like other countries in Latin America, required a process of increasing democratic openness. The later approach toward democratization was a radical change in the Colombian political system. Betancourt thought that the fundamental step towards the Colombian process of democratization was negotiating with the guerrillas on the basis of their likelihood of participating in a reformed political system.¹⁷⁴ It was the first time that the Colombian government tried to negotiate on condition of equality for an illegal armed group. Another first was the Colombian president recognizing structural causes that led to the armed conflict in Colombia—distribution of land; access to health and education; and political exclusion. During Betancourt’s administration, a ceasefire agreement was reached, and the discussion of the major problems of the country began. Unfortunately, no final agreements were ever reached. Lack of guarantees for tolerance of political opposition, attacks on civilians, and paramilitary presence affected the peace process; therefore, the truce did not last long, and peace could not be achieved.

Former President Virgilio Barco took office after Betancourt. At the beginning of his term, President Barco promised an uncompromising stance against any armed actor existing in Colombia. However, the level of violence in the country changed his mind and made him seek an agreement with the terrorists. By the time President Virgilio Barco’s administration ended in 1990, the government tried to fight not only the FARC and the ELN, but also the EPL, M-19, and drug cartels, especially the powerful Medellín Cartel that at the time was the most violent group in Colombia.

The M-19 was gradually reduced in strength and effectiveness through sustained attacks from the government, prompting negotiations with Barco’s government and his conciliatory policies. Between January 1989 and March 1990, after several negotiations, Barco’s government achieved demobilization and dissolution of this armed organization,

¹⁷⁴ Marc Chernick, “Aprender del Pasado: Breve historia de los Procesos de Paz en Colombia (1982–1996),” [Learning from the Past: A Brief History of the Peace Process in Colombia (1982–1996)], accessed June 29, 2016, <https://colombiainternacional.uniandes.edu.co/view.php/241/view.php>.

and subsequently the creation of their own political party.¹⁷⁵ Colombian researcher and Professor Mario Ramirez-Orozco, Ph.D. in Latin American studies and author of *Peace without Guile*, explains Barco's peace process:

A space for peace was opened, allowing the demobilization of M-19, the armed movement Quintin Lame, a percentage of the EPL and the PRT [Partido revolucionario de los Trabajadores]. Most of those demobilized were asking for social and political inclusion. Therefore, that political inclusion would create an opportunity for a new constitution in 1991. However, this new constitution did not take into account FARC and ELN, who continued committing crimes.¹⁷⁶

This attempt at peace was partially effective, it secured the incorporation to normalize life for some guerrilla groups, but was a partial peace, and it left out the main insurgency groups, including the FARC and ELN. However, the FARC and ELN did not want peace. At the time of the new constitution, they were interested in their principal goal: "Overthrowing the government." The 1990s would become a decade for the relentless use of violence to achieve their objective.

With the fall of the USSR at the end of 1991, the FARC demonstrated its ability to adapt. It was expected that the FARC would end at the same time as the fall of the USSR, along with its ideology of communism. However, this organization showed a high level of flexibility to conform to a new situation. David Kilcullen explains this flexibility in his article "Colombia a Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace," asserting: "With the collapse of Communism in the early 1990s, the prospect of external support receded even further, and narcotics became a key source of funding, along with kidnapping and extortion. Drugs brought in an estimated \$3.5 billion annually by 2005, or 45 percent of FARC's funding."¹⁷⁷ The income derived from illicit activities allowed the FARC to recruit numerous followers and strengthen its influential presence in areas

¹⁷⁵ "25 Años de un Proceso de Paz," [25 Years of a Peace Process] *El Espectador*, accessed August 24, 2016, <http://www.elespectador.com/files/especiales/procesodepazm19/index.html>.

¹⁷⁶ David Baracaldo, "La Mala Suerte de los 10 Intentos de Paz que ha Tenido Colombia" [The Bad Luck of the Peace Process in Colombia], accessed June 29, 2016, <http://www.kienyke.com/politica/los-diez-intentos-fallidos-de-proceso-de-paz-en-colombia/>.

¹⁷⁷ David Kilcullen and Greg Mills, "Colombia: A Political Economy of War to an Inclusive Peace," *PRISM* 5, no 3 (2015): 109.

of settlement, but above all else, to diversify holdings more strategically by extending its network throughout Colombia. Such diversification included livestock and oil rich areas near the Magdalena Medio, Cordoba, and Casanare and agro-industrial regions such as Urabá, which bordered neighboring nations. These interests were vital to key logistical hubs on the Pacific coast and the Caribbean, for ease of exporting drugs and importing arms.

Over the last 30 years, with nearly continuous violence perpetuated by the cocaine trade, Colombia has suffered a tragedy due to the challenges against traditional state security and the formalized economy. The profits produced by illicit activities of criminal organizations, such as the Medellín Cartel, the Cali Cartel, and of course, the FARC, have not only sustained these groups but supported exponential growth. The Medellín Cartel, once headed by the infamous Pablo Escobar, accumulated a fortune in drug money in the 1980s, using it to initiate a terrorist offensives against the government. The nefarious methods used by the Medellín Cartel included the use of car bombs and targeted killings of government officials such as police officers, judges, politicians, or any individual who could not be coopted. Those coercive methods were used by the Medellín Cartel to force the government to give them privileges, such as putting an end to extradition of fellow cartel members to the United States.

Former President Cesar Gaviria was in office from 1990 to 1994.¹⁷⁸ He took office amid rising violence after Luis Carlos Galán the presidential candidate from the Liberal Party who was assassinated,¹⁷⁹ along with the murders of two others candidates on the left, including the M- 19 candidate, Carlos Pizarro.¹⁸⁰ The administration of Gaviria wanted to find a solution to the armed conflict in Colombia and discuss major national security issues. The guerrillas intended to discuss the national crisis, but they were not interested in a solution to the conflict. However, in March 1992, Gaviria's

¹⁷⁸ David Bushnell, "Historical Setting," 57.

¹⁷⁹ Stella Tocancipa, "Gaviria Trujillo, Cesar," Banco de la Repùblica Actividad Cultural, accessed August 22, 2016, <http://www.banrepvirtual.org/blaavirtual/biografias/cesar-gaviria>.

¹⁸⁰ Diego Arias, "Carlos Pizarro, el Líder del M-19 que Apostó por la Paz," [Carlos Pizarro, The Leader of M-19 who Bet for Peace] *El Tiempo*, April 26, 205, <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/muerte-de-carlos-pizarro-lider-del-m-19-que-apostó-por-la-paz/15631455>.

administration established peace talks with the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar (CGSB) composed of the FARC, ELN, and EPL remains in Tlaxcala, Mexico.¹⁸¹

Additionally, President Gaviria attempted to negotiate with the Medellín Cartel. Gaviria received congressional approval for non-extradition of Colombian citizens to the United States for drug trafficking, using it as an incentive to meet the principle request of Pablo Escobar and his Medellín Cartel lieutenants. The latter request was elaborated on by David Bushnell, one of the world's leading experts on the history of Colombia, "The new president proposed that any trafficker who voluntarily surrendered to the Colombian Authorities and pleaded guilty to one or more charges would not be extradited to the United States but instead tried in Colombia, where sentences were both lighter and more predictable than in the U.S. judicial system."¹⁸² However, despite the government's concessions for an appeal to peace, Pablo Escobar continued trafficking drugs, killing, corrupting institutions, and doing anything within his power to expand his criminal network to gain more power. Therefore, the government changed its position and decided to wage a war against the Medellín Cartel, which led to the successful killing of Pablo Escobar and dismantling of his organization.

Former President Ernesto Samper served as president of Colombia from 1994 to 1998,¹⁸³ succeeding Cesar Gaviria. President Samper was inept at negotiations with terrorist groups and governing the country. During his administration, Samper was devoted to defending his own integrity from allegations of corruption and accusations of accepting drug money to finance his campaign.¹⁸⁴ As a result, the Samper government was ineffective at addressing the issue of internal security, and then the FARC took control of the drug trade left behind from the Medellín Cartel. After the fall of Pablo Escobar and the disintegration of the Medellín Cartel, the FARC found a unique opportunity to seize a very lucrative illicit business. The financial resources obtained

¹⁸¹ Kline, *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold*, 19.

¹⁸² David Bushnell, *The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 267.

¹⁸³ Kline, *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold*, 27.

¹⁸⁴ Arlene Tickner, "Government and Politics," in *Colombia: A Country Study*, ed. Rex Hudson (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, 2010), 216.

through the drug trade were substantially more than the FARC had previously received from the international support of communist sympathizers: “Millions of drug dollars provided FARC with a kind of steroid boost allowing the rebel army to expand from 6,000 members in 1982 to about 20,000 fighters at the peak of its military power in the early 2000s.”¹⁸⁵ The substantial increase in funding from the drug trade supported the FARCs ability for expansion of personnel and support for the transition from a second stage “strategic equilibrium” to a “strategic offensive.” The result was the unleashing of a wave of violence and terrorist attacks against the government, its institutions, and the civilian population.

In the late 1990s, according to Colombian government statistics, as a result of financing from the drug trade, FARC offensive operations increased from two to seven actions daily. Likewise, they increased acts of sabotage and terrorism in Colombia’s most significant cities, using explosive devices, which targeted security forces.¹⁸⁶ The FARC discovered that the drug trade was not only lucrative, but enabled the purchase of weapons and explosives, as well as increased recruitment. Colombia almost reached the threshold of becoming a “failed state” due to a combination of violence, drug trafficking, and the government’s inability to address the security situation, which de-legitimized the government. However, President Samper’s attempts to move toward peace most prominently were carried out with the ELN in the city of Mainz in Germany.¹⁸⁷ The end result was void of achieving any progress.

In 1998, former President Andres Pastrana was elected president of Colombia, largely due to his promises of potentially reaching an agreement with the FARC. The FARC publicly expressed its support for President Pastrana before the general elections. Nina Serrano, a specialist in National Security Affairs, asserted that President Pastrana,

¹⁸⁵ John Otis, “The FARC and Colombia’s Illegal Drug Trade,” Wilson Center Latin American Program, (November 2014): 2, [.https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Otis_FARCDrugTrade2014.pdf)

¹⁸⁶ Mario Aguilera, “Guerrilla y Población Civil. Trayectoria de las FARC 1949–2013” [Guerrilla and Civilian Population. FARC’s History 1949–2013] (Bogota, Colombia: Centro de Memoria Historica, 2013), 214. <http://www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/descargas/informes2013/farc/guerrilla-poblacion-civil.pdf>.

¹⁸⁷ Kline, *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold*, 38.

“Responded to FARC’s request to create a demilitarized zone and ordered the withdrawal of security forces from five municipalities for 90 days.”¹⁸⁸ In exchange, the FARC simply had to agree to start peace negotiations. The FARC came to the negotiation table with the upper hand from its increase by almost 20,000 armed combatants and their ability to wreak havoc.

The peace process during the Pastrana administration lasted for more than three years, but was systemically troubled by its lack of an effective agenda, irregularities in determining the demilitarized zone, and an unwillingness of FARC members to come to agreement on issues. The demilitarized zone gave the FARC a legitimized space, where they could train, rest, and be internationally recognized, to the credit of journalists who sought recognition by speaking with the oldest guerrilla group in Latin America. The FARC has historically set a precedent by using negotiations with the government to its advantage, as explained by Reiss: “Negotiations were merely tactics to give the terrorists time to rest, rearm, and prepare the next round of war.”¹⁸⁹ On February 20, 2002, Andres Pastrana decided to end the peace process with the FARC, after the kidnapping of Congressman Luis Eduardo Gechem by members of the rebel group on a commercial flight.¹⁹⁰ President Pastrana ordered the Colombian Armed Forces to recover the demilitarized zone and initiate an offensive against the FARC throughout Colombia’s territory. As a response to the government offensive, the FARC increased its terrorist attacks.

However, concurrent with the peace process, President Pastrana began transforming the Colombian Military Forces through Plan Colombia, with support from the United States, to directly combat drug trafficking and similar organizations profiting from the drug trade.

¹⁸⁸ Nina Serrafino, *Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background* (New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2003), 17.

¹⁸⁹ Reiss, *Negotiating with Evil*, 224.

¹⁹⁰ “Cronología: Así Fueron los Diálogos de San Vicente del Caguán,” [Chronology: How Were the Peace Negotiations in San Vicente del Caguán] *Periodico el Colombiano*, August 27, 2012, http://www.elcolombiano.com/historico/dialogos_en_san_vicente_del_caguan_cronologia-CFEC_204017.

Former President Alvaro Uribe took office on August 7, 2002, as the new President of Colombia, succeeding Andres Pastrana.¹⁹¹ President Uribe came to power with the promise to increase military efforts against the FARC and increase overall public security levels in Colombia. Therefore, Uribe continued the military transformation started under the previous administration. The goal was to ensure governmental presence in almost every city, town, or village in Colombia, by using state security and military organizations. With increased military presence throughout Colombia, the FARC were less likely to occupy ungoverned spaces and freely conduct illicit activities.

As soon as public security was established in regions not previously having a military presence, it would signal to the central government that other government institutions could move into those spaces in order to offer basic services such as health, education, and justice, among others. This strategy was called the “Democratic Security Policy,” prompting a significant increase in the number of members in the military and police, and then the overall professionalism and initiative for the development of joint operations transpired. The FARC had been delegitimized after terrorist attacks that ended the peace process with former President Andres Pastrana. The FARC continued to lose the support of the population with every occurrence of a new terrorist offensive. The strategy developed by former President Uribe’s administration received daily support from the Colombian population. Michael Freeman, Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, explains what happens when terrorism does not work:

The accepted level of violence by the population will rise as they get used to terrorism. Thus, the amount of violence required to create a condition of terror is higher. Over time, then, terrorist violence actually loses its effectiveness. If it terrorizes the population less, the terrorist group will be less likely to be able to coerce the state in the way that it desires. When this occurs, acts of violence no longer have the capacity to terrorize the population.¹⁹²

Colombians began to feel less afraid to report attacks and actions of the FARC. The FARCs inability to effectively coerce and extort the government and the civilian

¹⁹¹ Tickner, “Government and politics,” 261

¹⁹² Michael Freeman, “International Terrorism: Terrorism’s Internal Contradiction” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 3, 2016).

population made the FARC lose credibility. Colombians protested against the FARC with the largest demonstration in the history of Colombia, taking to the streets to say “No more FARC,” and thus repudiate the terrorist actions carried out by this group.¹⁹³ The FARC received the most important military setbacks in its history. Three out of its seven leaders were killed in military actions, something that had never happened previously to this organization. In addition, its leader “Manuel Marulanda” died in the jungle due to a heart attack.¹⁹⁴ Marulanda was one of the FARC’s founders when the FARC was created in 1964, and the absence of one of its most charismatic leaders in the terrorist group pushed them toward decline. The death of Marulanda had a lasting impact on the members of the FARC. Michael Freeman argues, “Without a charismatic or visionary leader, the group may face a renewed collective action problem. Potential and existing members may be less willing to fight and possibly die for less inspiring or charismatic leaders.”¹⁹⁵ The death of their leaders created an environment of low morale among members of the FARC, and the number of demobilized increased. FARC leader Ivan Rios was killed by one of his bodyguards, and to prove it, the guilty bodyguard cut off Ivan Rios’ hand and gave it to the authorities.¹⁹⁶ Therefore, internal to the FARC, the environment became insidious and very divisive. The organization was not just losing its leadership, it was also losing power, cohesion, and morale. This is corroborated by Arias, who writes, “Uribe did not defeat the guerrillas, as was his intention. But he left it seriously wounded, cornered; more importantly, completely delegitimized in public opinion, with few exceptions, to the international community.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ Jenny Gonzalez and Simon Romero, “Marches Show Disgust with a Colombian Rebel Group,” *New York Times*, February 5, 2008, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/433793740?accountid=12702>.

¹⁹⁴ Simon Romero, “Death of Marulanda, Legendary Guerrilla Leader in Colombia, Is Confirmed,” *International Herald Tribune*, May 27, 2008, <http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/318908886?accountid=12702>.

¹⁹⁵ Michael Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership and Its Consequences for Leadership Targeting,” *Terrorism and Political Violence* 26, no 4 (2014): 6, doi: 10.1080/09546553.2013.751912.

¹⁹⁶ “El Guerrillero de las FARC ‘Ivan Rios’ fue Asesinado por su Guardia Personal” Caracol Radio, March 7, 2008, http://caracol.com.co/radio/2008/03/07/judicial/1204898400_559986.html.

¹⁹⁷ Arias, *Historia de Colombia*, 187.

The peace process held in during the tenure of President Uribe was with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). The only agreements that occurred between Uribe's government and FARC were over humanitarian agreements to free hostages in FARC's control. The talks with the AUC were conducted in Ralito, in the province of Cordoba, Colombia, and achieved the demobilization of about 30,000 members of the AUC, and the release of key paramilitary leaders. The demobilization of the paramilitaries had permanent unresolved issues of impunity, because few details became public. Colombian citizens were ill informed to develop an educated opinion on the agreement, and further controversy arose because some elements of the organization did not demobilize, but rather formed a new emerging armed group known simply as a criminal gang. According to the Colombian Agency for Reintegration, of 3,500 demobilized paramilitary members who returned to commit a crime, 2,290 were arrested. The magnitude of the phenomenon of recidivism is hardly calculable.¹⁹⁸

B. NEW PRESIDENT, NEW STRATEGY

Juan Manuel Santos on August 7, 2010, was sworn in as president of Colombia.¹⁹⁹ Santos had served as defense minister during the Uribe administration. Santos came to power fully supported and promoted by previous President Uribe, and promised to continue the hard line policies of his predecessor against the FARC. Although in his inaugural address he spoke of continuing the policy of Uribe—democratic security policy—Santos also sent a message to the terrorist groups, assessing their interest to negotiate, something he had never mentioned during his campaign for the presidency:

With the consolidation of the democratic security we have made progress in this direction like never before, but still have some way to go. Reaching this end will remain a priority, and I ask the new leadership of our Armed Forces to continue giving results and producing compelling advancements.

¹⁹⁸ Enzo Nussio, "Reincidir o no Reincidir," [Relapse or not Relapse] *Pensamiento Jurídico*, no. 26 (December 2009): 216.

¹⁹⁹ "Santos se Posesiona como Presidente," [Santos Takes Office as President] *El Tiempo*, December 31, 2010, <http://www.eltiempo.com/archivo/documento/CMS-8713380>.

At the same time I want to reiterate what I have said in the past: The door to dialogue is not locked.²⁰⁰

With this statement, Santos opened the door to begin a dialogue and FARC agreed to negotiate with the government again, this time with Santos' administration. On October 16, 2012, two years after starting the mandate of Santos, it was made official in Oslo, Norway.²⁰¹ The opening of negotiations commenced between the Colombian government and the FARC; a few months later, talks moved to Havana, Cuba, where talks have recently ended. The critics and comments, against and in favor of Santos' approach with FARC, did not wait. Especially, from the majority of his constituency who elected him to continue with the purpose of accomplishing a military defeat of the FARC.

What prompted Santos' decision to change his approach from during the campaign to when he took office? Why did Santos make the decision to negotiate with the FARC, when it has been proven in previous negotiations that the FARC's strategy is to use negotiations to recover from battle fatigue? Santos' arguments were mainly based on the length of the protracted war in Colombia, almost 50 years to the date he took office, and the magnitude of the damage that the war has caused throughout all this time. Despite the military successes of recent years and the decline in the strategy of the FARC, this homegrown terrorist group continues to be financed by the drug trade. If an end to the conflict is not achieved by the current negotiations, the same vicious cycle of war is certain to continue for many more years in Colombia. The FARC simply redeploy, enter into a stage of resilience, avoid becoming small, get reorganized, and wait to attack again. This argument is quite valid considering the arguments of James Fearon, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University: "Civil wars last a long time when neither side

²⁰⁰ Presidencia de Colombia, "Discurso Posesión Juan Manuel Santos," [Juan Manuel Santos' Possession speech] accessed June 7, 2016, http://wsp.presidencia.gov.co/Prensa/2010/Agosto/Paginas/20100807_15.aspx

²⁰¹ "Cronología del Proceso de Paz entre el Gobierno Nacional y las FARC," [Chronology of the Peace Process between The Colombian Government and the FARC] *El País*, September 23, 2015, <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/colombia/proceso-paz/noticias/cronologia-proceso-paz-entre-gobierno-nacional-y-farc>.

can disarm the other, causing a military stalemate.”²⁰² The stalemate makes a negotiated settlement a feasible option to solve the conflict.

President Santos’ second argument for a settlement is the economic cost of the war. In the latest report of the global peace index, expenditures made by Colombia to address violence reached \$139.5 billion by 2015, an increase of 58 percent from 2008. This represents 30 percent of the GDP of Colombia.²⁰³ Negotiations with the FARC obviously allow investment in the war, which may reduce funding that could be diverted to cover other needs in Colombia, such as education, health, and infrastructure, among others. Reiss observes about the cost of war: “Killing or capturing every terrorist is not operationally possible, politically feasible, or financially affordable.”²⁰⁴ Because of these high costs, the military solution is not the best option, and the decision to opt for a negotiated settlement is the better solution.

Harvey Kline, in his book *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold: The Peace Process of Colombian President Andres Pastrana*, which was written and published five years before the start of the peace process between the Santos government and the FARC, includes an argument that could be considered one of the reasons why Santos changed his thinking. “The president in Colombia sees himself and is seen by his close followers as a messiah and often is concerned with his place in history.”²⁰⁵ If Uribe is to be remembered for his war against the FARC, then Santos would be remembered for having finally achieved the peace: “I want peace. And of course I wish that history remembered me as the president who made peace in Colombia.”²⁰⁶

²⁰² James Fearon, “Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others,” *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no 3 (May, 2004): 276.

²⁰³ “Plantean Debate Sobre los Efectos de los Acuerdos de Paz en la Economía,” [A Debate is Rising in Colombia, about the Effects of the Peace Process in the Economy] *El Tiempo*, June 8, 2016, <http://www.eltiempo.com/economia/sectores/efectos-de-los-acuerdos-de-paz-en-la-economia-del-pais/16615076>

²⁰⁴ Reiss, *Negotiating with Evil*, 222.

²⁰⁵ Kline, *Chronicle of a Failure Foretold*, 25.

²⁰⁶Juan Perez, “Juan Manuel Santos: “Están Haciendo una Guerra Sucia, contra el Proceso de Paz,”” [Juan Manuel Santos: ‘There Is a Dirty War against the Peace Process’] *BBC*, April 22, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias/2014/04/140422_mexico_colombia_entrevista_juan_manuel_santos_j_cps.

C. CONCLUSIONS

Many factors influence the decision to talk with terrorists and insurgents: the duration of war, the number of deaths that terrorism has caused, and the destruction that terrorism has generated, among others. Because of these factors, leaders seek, through a negotiated agreement, to solve the conflict with terrorists and insurgents. However, it is very important to note when a government should negotiate with terrorists and insurgents. Professionals in negotiations claim that the best time to arrive to the peace talks is with a favorable position, in order to establish the conditions for negotiation and exercise, one way or another, additional pressure on the group that is negotiating. Thus, Colombia's administrations have felt they were in a stronger position and inevitably decided to negotiate with the FARC. Despite having this favorable position, the government's negotiations have ended in a stalemate, which is the usual occurrence in Colombia. The stalemate has also influenced the Santos government's decision to negotiate with the FARC. The continuity of the stalemate could bring more years of war ahead, without any solution in sight, making the government think a negotiation is necessary.

Should governments negotiate with the terrorists and insurgents? Yes. But the government should negotiate only when it is confident of its strong position in the negotiation. A privileged position can only be achieved if the terrorists and insurgents arrive weakened to the negotiations due to a permanent effort by military achievement from the government. One of the most memorable phrases of Benjamin Netanyahu explains this position: "Peace is purchased from strength. It's not purchased from weakness or unilateral retreats."²⁰⁷ Terrorists usually consider that when the government issues the first sign of a willingness to negotiate, this willingness is a sign of weakness. Therefore, no sign of weakness should be made apparent. On the contrary, the offensive must be kept in order to make terrorists think twice and request a negotiation with the government. Because Santos's government was the first to engage with the will to negotiate, the FARC took advantage of this opportunity and came to the negotiations with a strengthened position necessary to achieve its ends from the government.

²⁰⁷ Bret Stephens, "Iran Is The Terrorist 'Mother Regime,'" *Wall Street Journal*, January 24, 2009, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123275466964911679>.

VI. SECURITY GUARANTEES TO THE ENEMY ARE IMPORTANT FACTORS TO AVOID THE RECURRENCE OF WAR

On August 26, 2016, negotiators from the Colombian Government and the FARC announced in Havana, Cuba, that they had reached a final and definitive agreement to end their armed conflict.²⁰⁸ Later, the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, informed the Colombian population that more than 50 years of war with the FARC had come to an end. During this announcement, President Juan Manuel Santos informed the public about the agreement that had been reached during almost four years of negotiations. The agreement includes six main points:

- Agricultural development policy
- Political Participation
- Ending the conflict
- Solution to the problem of illicit drugs
- Victims
- Implementation and verification.²⁰⁹

The Colombian Government and the FARC claimed that by abiding by these agreements, Colombia would be able to reach a stable and lasting peace.

Ending the conflict was one of the most difficult points for the two parties to agree upon. The FARC agreed to lay down their arms and start the process of DDR, while the government would provide all necessary security conditions for the FARC to

²⁰⁸ “Comunicado Conjunto, Gobierno y FARC-EP Anunciamos que Hemos Llegado a un Acuerdo Final, integral y Definitivo,” [Joint Communique, Government and FARC-EP Announced that We Have Reached a Definitive Final Agreement] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, accessed October 5, 2016, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/procesos-y-conversaciones/documentos-y-comunicados-conjuntos/Paginas/Comunicado-Conjunto-No-93-24-de-agosto-de-2016.aspx..>

²⁰⁹ “Así Va el Proceso de Paz,” [How the Peace Process Goes] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, accessed October 5, 2016, <http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/Paginas/inicio.aspx>.

reintegrate into society.²¹⁰ The negotiators noted that personal safety was one of the factors that caused the FARC leadership to waver in their commitment to agree to end the conflict. This chapter demonstrates the importance of both sides abiding by the agreements. Therefore, special preference is made toward the physical security guarantees of the demobilized, because it is one the main worries of those demobilizing—the security dilemma. The armed forces have an obligation to ensure their physical security and reduce threats to those who have turned in their weapons. Game theory is used also in this chapter, to demonstrate why it is important for the government to provide enough security to those demobilizing and to abide by the agreements, specifically with regard to the guarantee of security. With this game theory model, the chapter demonstrates why it is more beneficial for both parties to act in accordance with the agreements ending the conflict than to violate them.

A. THE SECURITY DILEMMA

In the third point of the agreement, the FARC agreed to lay down their arms and start the process of DDR.²¹¹ This would begin reintegration into civilian life, and initiate their participation into politics without using weapons.²¹² The government for its part promises to provide all necessary security conditions for the FARC to be able to return to society and to participate in politics.²¹³ Therefore, the Colombian government agrees to use its military and police forces to provide security to FARC members as they demobilize. The military will also assist with the reintegration of those demobilized back into Colombian society. This commitment by the Colombian government and its armed forces is required in order to fulfill the main objective of the agreements—to reach a stable and lasting peace in Colombia. Salomons mentions the importance of safety as a factor in recurrence in war: “The most important factor in ensuring non-recurrence of

²¹⁰ “Acuerdo Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera,” [“Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Achieving a Stable and Lasting Peace] Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 57, 59, accessed October 5, 2016,
<https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/sites/default/files/acuerdo-final-1473286288.pdf>.

²¹¹ Ibid., 59.

²¹² Ibid., 50.

²¹³ Ibid., 70.

hostilities is by establishing security. The basic need for freedom from violence is an absolute prerequisite for any effective post-conflict recovery process.”²¹⁴ Thus, the military and police forces must make a serious effort to prevent any action that threatens the security of the FARC-members. Threats to demobilized FARC members may come from other terrorist organizations that commit crimes in Colombia, or even from some members of the armed forces who disagree with the negotiated settlement between the Colombian government and the FARC. If violent actions against FARC members demobilizing can be avoided, the FARC would have less reason or excuse to take up arms to fight against the government again.

The lack of personal security has been a negative aspect of previous peace agreements with some subversive and terrorist organizations in Colombia. The murder of guerrilla group members from previous agreements has caused doubt among current armed group members about whether to trust the government with protecting them once they have surrendered their weapons. For example, one of the most infamous cases in Colombia was the assassination of Guadalupe Salcedo, leader of the Liberal guerrillas in the Colombian plains during the time of “La Violencia” (1948–1958).²¹⁵ Salcedo was assassinated in 1957, three years after having reached an agreement with General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla’s government.²¹⁶ The death of Salcedo and other leaders of the Liberal guerrillas forced some demobilized members to return to possession of weapons for personal protection, continuing the violence in Colombia.

Another example is the demobilization of the rebel group EPL in the early 1990s in Colombia. The EPL reached an agreement with the government of President Cesar Gaviria.²¹⁷ However, this agreement was regarded as a betrayal of the rebel cause by the

²¹⁴ Salomons, “Security an Absolute Requisite,” in *Postconflict Development: Meeting New Challenges*, 57.

²¹⁵ Eugenio Gomez, “La Guerrilla Liberal,” [The Liberal Guerrilla] *Revista Credencial*, October 2006, <http://www.banrepultural.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/octubre2006/guerrilla.htm>.

²¹⁶ Roberto Romero, “Guadalupe Salcedo el firmante de los Acuerdos de Paz de Ariporo,” [Guadalupe Salcedo the Signer of the Peace Accords in Ariporo] *Las 2 Orillas*, September 17, 2013, <http://www.las2orillas.co/guadalupe-salcedo-el-firmante-de-los-acuerdos-de-paz-de-ariporo/>.

²¹⁷ Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, *Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), 72.

FARC, and the FARC killed almost 700 members of the demobilized EPL members.²¹⁸ There is also the case of Carlos Pizarro Leongómez, who demobilized from the guerrilla movement *19 de Abril* (M-19).²¹⁹ Pizarro was assassinated on April 26, 1989, months after his demobilization, while he was campaigning for the presidency of Colombia. His murder was carried out by an alliance between drug traffickers and right-wing groups in Colombia.²²⁰

The potential lack of protection for demobilized members of the FARC is a strong risk to the peace settlement. Enzo Nussio, a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at the University of St. Gallen (Switzerland), suggests: “The lack of physical security is one reason for the renewed violence, as demobilized are exposed to threats of old enemies or attracted by former colleagues to join again to his troops or new illegal groups.”²²¹ Failures in the protection of those demobilizing has led some ex-combatants to prefer returning to guerrilla or terrorist organizations, resulting in the recurrence in war. Similarly, these flaws in the physical protection of those demobilized have generated distrust toward government institutions, creating a state of vulnerability. This state of vulnerability has been called by some scholars “the security dilemma” for those who are planning to demobilize.

The security dilemma, when a civil war has taken place, refers to the various fears that groups negotiating face in trusting each other. For those demobilizing, one of their fears would be the inability to defend themselves against a possible attack from an old enemy or enemies who appear during the stage of demobilization and reintegration, since they do not have a weapon to defend themselves and ensure their own survival. Caroline

²¹⁸ “Lo que Dejo la Paz con el EPL 25 Años Despues,” [What Let the Peace with the EPL 25 Years Later] *El Tiempo*, March 5, 2016, <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/proceso-de-paz/la-paz-con-el-epl-despues-de-25-anos/16528987>.

²¹⁹ Diego Arias, “Carlos Pizarro, el Líder del M-19 que Aposto por la Paz,” [Carlos Pizarro, The Leader of M-19 who Bet for Peace] *El Tiempo*, April 26, 2015, <http://www.eltiempo.com/politica/justicia/muerte-de-carlos-pizarro-lider-del-m-19-que-aposto-por-la-paz/15631455>

²²⁰ Colprensa, “Como Va la Investigación por el Crimen de Carlos Pizarro?”[How Does the Investigation of Carlos Pizarro’s Death Go?] *El País*, April 26, 2015, <http://www.elpais.com.co/elpais/judicial/noticias/como-va-investigacion-por-crimen-carlos-pizarro>.

²²¹ Nussio, “Relapse or no Relapse,” 9.

Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, write about these fears: “In the absence of assurances that the processes of disarmament or reorganization will not leave them vulnerable to future aggression, parties to the conflict often prove reluctant to either reach or honor negotiated settlements.”²²² Yet, these fears are not only faced by those who want to demobilize; the government and its institutions also harbor similar fears. In this sense, the government expects that the subversive or terrorist groups who have promised to disarm and demobilize will comply. The FARC has shown commitment to their contribution to effectively build and consolidate the path towards peace in everything that is within their capabilities. The FARC must respect the fundamental rights of all Colombian inhabitants, and ensure the legitimate monopoly of force and the use of weapons is held by the State throughout its sovereign territory while guaranteeing the non-recurrence of violence.

Trust between both sides comes into play during the post-conflict period. Nevertheless, trust is hard to come by after so many years of war, so the security dilemma arises. Peter Wallensteen says: “The parties who sign the agreements are likely to be highly suspicious of each other, with good reason. In their agitation, they have often emphasized that the other side is criminal, illegitimate, corrupt and untrustworthy.”²²³ The restoration of trust between the parties is a long and fragile process. Any incident, regardless of how small it may be, can be perceived as an act of provocation by one side to the other. The agreements reached under such circumstances might be unsustainable. The fragility of the agreements is explained by Dr. Gordon McCormick, Professor in the Department of Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School, and Distinguished Professor Dr. Guillermo Owen, of the Department of Applied Mathematics at the Naval Postgraduate School: “With each side unwilling to trust the other, fighting is often the best of a bad set of options.”²²⁴ By guaranteeing the physical protection of the

²²² Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security: Comparing Theoretical Approaches to the Process of Disarmament following Civil War.” *Contemporary Security Policy* 27, no. 1 (2006): 156.

²²³ Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System* (Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2007), 138.

²²⁴ Gordon McCormick and Guillermo Owen, “Factionalism, Violence and Bargaining in Civil Wars,” *Homo Oeconomicus* 20, (2004): 363.

demobilizing members, the government can offer the first sign of its commitment to the agreement and a firm step towards achieving a stable and lasting peace.

B. TO ABIDE BY OR NOT ABIDE BY THE GUARANTEES OF SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT

A finite two-person general-sum game can be expressed as a pair of $m \times n$ matrices, $A=(a_{ij})$ and $B=(b_{ij})$, or equivalently, as an $m \times n$ matrix (A,B) each of those entries is an ordered pair (a_{ij},b_{ij}) . The entries a_{ij} and b_{ij} are the payoffs (in utilities) to the players I and II, respectively.²²⁵

The decision to abide or not abide by the agreements made in a negotiated settlement depends on the benefits or payoffs that can be received by the parties involved. For example, if the benefits of acting in accordance with the agreements outweigh the benefits gained from not acting in accordance with them, a rational actor will choose the option of abiding by the agreements. Conversely, if the profits of not abiding by the agreements outweigh the benefits or payoffs of abiding by such agreements, a rational actor would choose not to abide by them. Martin Peterson, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden, explains what a rational decision is: “If and only if the decision maker chooses to do what she has most reason to do at the point in time at which the decision is made.”²²⁶

This section employs game theory in order to understand which decision would be more beneficial to each of the parties, the Colombian government and the FARC. This approach enables the reader to understand whether each side would act in accordance with the agreements. Although a final agreement was reached between the Colombian government and the FARC, this game theory model emphasizes the third point of the agreement—ending the conflict.

Game theory is the study of how players should rationally act in a given set of circumstances and choices of action.²²⁷ Each player would like the game to end in an

²²⁵ Guillermo Owen, *Game Theory* (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 161.

²²⁶ Martin Peterson, *An Introduction to Decision Theory* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 5.

²²⁷ Willian Fox, “Models of Conflict Course and Lesson Notes” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 3, 2016).

outcome giving him the largest payoff possible.²²⁸ Game theory allows a player or representative to analyze from a set of strategies or gambling options available, which one turns out to be more beneficial or is the most likely to give him an advantage over his opponent.²²⁹ Two types of games are most commonly used for testing the decision-making process. The first is a two-person zero-sum game, which is defined by mathematician Guillermo Owen as: “a game in which everything that someone wins must be lost by someone else.”²³⁰ That is to say, one player chooses a strategy that allows him to get everything the opponent will lose. The second is a two-person non-zero-sum game. Professor of Mathematics at Beloit College, Philip Straffin, explains that in this type of game “the interests of the two players are not strictly opposed, and not strictly coincidence.”²³¹ Therefore, both players decide to pursue strategies that permit them to benefit together, without the benefits being the same for both, but at the end satisfactory for both. The two-person non-zero-sum game will be used to analyze which would be the best decision to be taken by the Colombian government and the FARC—to act or not to act in accordance with the agreements for ending the conflict.

Four strategies are presented as possible decisions that could be taken by the Colombian government (G) and the FARC (F) before the agreement of a bilateral ceasefire. Therefore, each strategy offers a payoff from one (1) to four (4), according to the benefits received with a specific strategy. Four (4) will be the highest value for a specific strategy adopted, while one (1) will be the lowest payoff.

G1= the Colombian government uses the armed forces and the police to prevent any kind of threat against the members of FARC who demobilize.

G2= the Colombian government does not abide by the ceasefire and decides to use the armed forces against the FARC when they concentrate and can be destroyed.

²²⁸ Philip Straffin, *Game Theory and Strategy* (Washington, DC: Mathematical Association of America, 1993), 4.

²²⁹ Willian Fox, “Models of Conflict Course and Lesson Notes” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 3, 2016).

²³⁰ Owen, *Game Theory*, 11.

²³¹ Straffin, *Game Theory and Strategy*, 66.

F1= FARC abides by the ceasefire, turns in all weapons, and demobilizes all its members.

F2= FARC does not abide by the ceasefire, and uses the concentration zones to reorganize and attack the government in order to achieve its main objective of overthrowing the government and establishing a communist regime.

In Table 1, it can be seen what the assumptions and possible outcomes are for each one of the parties, the Colombian government and the FARC, when they choose a specific strategy in order to understand why the values are assigned as the payoffs.

Table 1. Possible Outcomes

Colombian Government (G)		FARC (F)	
G1F1=4	The agreements are respected and trusted between the parties. This trust allows for paving the way for “stable and lasting peace.” Respect for the agreements would bring greater international support for the post-conflict period.	G1F1=4	The agreements are respected and trusted between the parties. This trust allows for paving the way for “stable and lasting peace.” Respect for the agreements would bring greater international support for the post-conflict period.
G1F2=3	The Colombian government receives more international support to fight against terrorism and to defeat the FARC militarily.	G2F1=3	FARC would receive legitimacy from the international community.
G2F2=2	The Colombian government returns to the counterinsurgency strategy and the war continues.	G2F2=2	FARC returns to guerrilla warfare. The war continues.
G2F1=1	The Colombian government would receive international condemnation; likewise, the international community would reduce its financial support to Colombia.	G1F2=1	FARC loses any political rights achieved; likewise, it would lose the support of the civilian population.

In Table 2, interactions can be seen between the Colombian government and the FARC. The numbers on the left of each square represent the values or payoffs that the Colombian government could obtain if the decision shown is adopted. The numbers on the right represent the payoffs obtained by the FARC based on this type of decision. The strategy G1 for the Colombian government would be the preferred strategy, since it gives the highest payoff (4) that can be obtained. Meanwhile, F1 is shown as the preferred

strategy for the FARC, obtaining the highest value (4). Therefore, it can be seen that the first row (G1) dominates the second row (G2), and also that the first column (F1) dominates the second column (F2). Consequently, both players should use G1F1—abide by—act in accordance with guarantees of security. Thus, G1F1 is a pure strategy. A pure strategy means: “Players can either play only one of their available strategies or they can play some mixture of strategies. If the players’ optimal strategy is to play only one strategy, this is called a pure strategy solution or solution in the pure strategies.”²³²

Hence, for both players, the Colombian government and the FARC, it is evident that the optimal strategy is to play G1F1. A Nash equilibrium can also be observed in Table 2. A Nash equilibrium “is an equilibrium point that is [a set of strategies] such that each player’s … strategy maximizes his pay-off if the strategy of the others are held fixed.”²³³ Thus, each player’s strategy is optimal against those of the other.²³⁴

Therefore, G1F1 is in Nash equilibrium because if the Colombian government knows that the FARC is going to abide by the agreements, then the Colombian government would not benefit by moving to another strategy; and if the FARC knows that the Colombian government is going to abide by the agreements, then the FARC would also benefit by not switching its strategy.

The equilibrium can be also found using a movement diagram. Mathematician William Fox explains the movement diagram: “For the Row player’s values draw an arrow in each column from the smaller value to the larger value. For the Column player’s value, draw an arrow from the smaller value to the larger value on each row.”²³⁵ Thus, if more than one arrow points to an outcome, there is a pure strategy solution.²³⁶ In Table 2 can be seen red arrows and blue arrows. These arrows represent the movements of the Colombian government and the FARC, respectively. Therefore, the Colombian

²³² Miroslav Feix, “Game Theory Toolkit and Workbook for Defense Analysis Students” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007).

²³³ Peterson, *An Introduction to Decision Theory*, 241.

²³⁴ Ibid.

²³⁵ Willian Fox, “Models of Conflict Course and Lesson Notes” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 10, 2016).

²³⁶ Ibid.

government G2 is smaller than G1 in F1, so the arrow goes from G2 to G1. G2 is smaller than G1 in F2, so the arrow goes from G2 to G1. For the FARC, F2 is smaller than F1 in G1, so the arrow goes from F2 to F1. In G2, F2 is smaller than F1, so the arrow goes from F2 to F1. Then, it can be observed that more than one arrow points to an outcome, in this case G1F1. Thus, G1F1 is a pure strategy solution.

Table 2. Movement Diagram

	FARC abides by the agreements F1	FARC does not abide by the agreements F2
Colombian Government abides by the agreements G1	4,4 ↑ ←	3,1 ↑ →
Colombian government does not abide by the agreements G2	1,3 ↓ →	2,2 ↑ →

Based on the condition that an agreement has already been achieved between the Colombian government and the FARC, it can be assumed that the parties are determined to cooperate with each other in order to obtain the best payoffs for both. Therefore, in a case like this it is important that both players have complete information; that means, each player must know that the result—Abide by G1—Abide by F1—is the best for both. Mathematician Guillermo Owen explains the importance of the cooperation in a game: “Cooperation between the players can work out to both players’ advantage.”²³⁷ Therefore, the Colombian government must explain to the FARC what the government’s objectives would be, and why the FARC should not mistrust the government’s commitment and should abide by the ceasefire. In this case, the Colombian government’s objective will be to guarantee the personal security for each one of FARC’s demobilized members. Likewise, the government must communicate the consequences if the FARC fails to abide by the ceasefire. Whichever party does not fulfill its part will suffer international opprobrium, as mentioned in the assumptions.

²³⁷ Guillermo Owen, *Game Theory* (New York: Academic Press, 1982), 161.

Pareto optimal analysis is another tool presented in game theory to determine whether there is a better outcome or decision to choose in a game. Straffin says that “an outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no such other outcome.”²³⁸ The way to see if a result is a Pareto optimal is by plotting the outcomes in a coordinate plane (Figure 1).




Figure 1. Payoff Polygon for Game

In this plane, the horizontal axis represents the payoffs obtained by the FARC. Meanwhile, the vertical axis represents the payoffs obtained by the Colombian government. The Pareto optimal outcomes are exactly those that lie on the “northeast” boundary of the payoff polygon.²³⁹ As can be appreciated from Figure 1, this boundary is located at the number 4 on the horizontal axis, and at the number 4 on the vertical axis. Therefore, the best result for both the Colombian government and the FARC is Abide by—Abide by.

C. CONCLUSIONS

Colombia has suffered from war for more than 50 years. The Colombian government and the FARC have inflicted pain on each other during the conflict.

²³⁸ Straffin, *Game Theory and Strategy*, 68.

²³⁹ Ibid.

Therefore, trust between these two is precarious. Peace processes are long and complicated; however, they offer an appropriate means to start building trust. The way in which the peace agreement has been reached between the Colombian government and the FARC has not been easy, and its implementation will likely be even more difficult. The hardest task for the military during the implementation of the agreement will be to keep the FARC demobilized and in a position in which they will neither have nor need their weapons for self-protection. Thus, the demobilized FARC must feel that the Colombian Armed Forces is fulfilling its constitutional obligation and is able to provide adequate protection. However, it is important to remember that this protection should not only be for demobilized persons, but for all Colombians.

The game theory model demonstrated the importance of abiding by the third point of the peace agreements—ending the conflict. It is important that the Colombian government uses its military and police forces properly to provide protection to the demobilized. The proper enforcement of protecting the demobilized allows reinforcement of the bridges of trust that have been built during the last four years of negotiations. As presented in the game theory model, abiding by the agreements will allow the Colombian government to obtain better benefits, not only nationally, but also internationally. Nationally, the most important result is to prevent the recurrence of war. Therefore, mitigating the reasons why the FARC may feel vulnerable and should reduce the possibility of their return to the use of weapons for self-protection and protest. Not abiding by agreements has been the norm in most of the peace processes in Colombia. Therefore, it has been one of the biggest obstacles to peace. Not abiding by the agreement has fueled more violence and increased the distrust between the terrorists and the state. Nevertheless, abiding by the agreements is a prerequisite for building permanent trust. The latter responsibility belongs to the government and the FARC members. The Colombian military forces meanwhile must continue assuring their place in Colombian history. First, the armed forces were the institution that was able to reduce the FARC threat and make them reach the point to negotiate with the government. Last, as the guarantors of peace, while abiding by the agreements, they support Colombia's eventual achievement of a stable and lasting peace.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

What are the factors for successful and failed transitions to peace after a negotiated settlement, and how can the Colombian Marines backed by the U.S. Armed Forces support civil authorities to sustain the peace and avoid the recurrence of intrastate conflict?

In the course of this study, the authors found that achievement of a negotiated peace settlement is difficult; however, it brings hope to a war-torn nation and can support the more difficult goal of achieving an enduring peace. Initially an environment of hope prevails once an agreement is reached. If expectations held by the parties to the agreement are not met; however, the ideal of hope can disappear during the period of implementation. During the implementation process, signs of diminished motivation can begin to emerge when parties realize the difficulties that must be overcome to see goals materialize from the agreement.

Based upon the research and analysis from this study, the authors determined the factors that contribute to the renewal of hostilities and the factors that help to sustain the peace. Therefore, the following negative factors contributing to the recurrence of internal conflict should be addressed for sustainable peace: 1) political exclusion; 2) coercion; 3) ethnic discrimination; 4) economic grievances; 5) weak states; 6) greed; and 7) destruction from previous civil war. The following factors could potentially make the implementation of the negotiated settlement a success. Therefore, the positive factors for application need the greatest focus, including: 1) power sharing; 2) peace building; and 3) economic development. By working to negate the negative factors, the government can allow the positive factors to take hold and sustain the peace.

These factors are described in detail in this study and are influential in the onset of intrastate conflict. Therefore, during the negotiation process, commonly proposed solutions to mitigate these factors should be generated to mitigate against the possibility of the onset of a renewed intrastate conflict. Thus, in a post-conflict period the goal of reducing the negative factors to the point of extinction is the optimal solution to achieve a

lasting and stable peace. However, when any of those negative factors persists during and after the post-conflict period, some spoilers will have the excuse to take up arms in protest to achieve their political or economic ends.

The immediate recommendation for sustaining the peace after a conflict period is to defer the risk of physical harm to former combatants. Previous experience in Colombia has proved this threat is real and can lead to the recurrence of hostilities. An example is the murder of former demobilized combatants after the negotiated settlement with the government led by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in the 1950s, which ultimately led to political violence in Colombia. More recently was the murder of demobilized members of the EPL by the FARC in the 1990s. The most difficult task for the military during the implementation of the agreements will be to keep demobilized FARC combatants safe and without the need to possess personal weapons for protection. Furthermore, successful disarmament will rely on intelligence specifying all weapons caches and with an accurate inventory of the number and condition of weapons. Thus, demobilized combatants must feel that the Colombian Armed Forces is fulfilling its constitutional obligation and is adequately protecting them. If proper conditions of security are provided to demobilized FARC combatants or any other group that wishes to demobilize, the likelihood for recurrence of hostilities is considerably decreased. By emphasizing the physical safety and security of demobilized combatants, the government can reduce political exclusion or the perception of political exclusion on the part of segments of demobilized combatants. Moreover, protection should not only be for demobilized combatants, but for all Colombians.

The term “post conflict” has recently been embedded in the Colombian national discourse. This is due in part to negotiations that have taken place between the Colombian government and the FARC in Havana, Cuba. At the same time that there has been an increased desire for peace in Colombia, there is much speculation over the future role of the armed forces during the post-conflict era. Some people insist on the need to reduce the size of the armed forces, including the Colombian Marines, as well as to decrease its operational budget, arguing that in Colombia there will no longer be any more armed insurrections. The argument is invalid, though, when considering the security

environment in Colombia. The FARC is not the only illegal armed group committing atrocities against the Colombian government and civilian population. This study demonstrates the strong need for the military to play a role in both security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

The leadership in the Colombian Ministry of Defense and senior political officials will soon decide on reforms giving recognition to the future role and mission of the Colombian Marines. Although the negotiated peace agreement with the FARC, once ratified by the Colombian people, would mean a reduction in violence, the environment of insecurity will inevitably persist. The reason lies with continuing hostilities invoked by other armed groups that threaten stability and security in the country.

The groups once called “criminal bands” (BACRIM) are now separated into two groups: Armed Organized Groups (GAO) and Armed Delinquent Organizations (DAO). The categorization is supported by two new directives from Colombia’s Ministry of Defense, numbers 15 and 16, regarding the circumstances under which the military can legitimately use force against armed groups consistent with international law. Colombia has identified three criminal organizations that fall into these categories: the Gulf Clan (formerly known as the *Úsuga*, and prior to that, the *Urabeños*), the *Pelusos*, and the *Puntilleros* (a group descended from the *ERPAC*). Consistent with the new designation, in November 2015, the Colombian Air Force bombarded an encampment of the Gulf Clan. The new directives also establish a legally defensible framework in which other groups who are currently considered mere delinquent organizations could be designated “Armed Organized Groups” in the future.²⁴⁰

Therefore, there is a strong possibility that if the DDR program is not successful at reintegrating demobilized members, they will revert to activities they are most accustomed to in order to sustain themselves. These income-generating activities tend to center on illicit activities tied to the drug trade, which may lead to rearming and forming new criminal groups in alliance with existing organizations. Therefore, demobilizing FARC members may fall back on what they know best, including the use of intimidation and the profitable pursuits in the drug trade to provide funding for nefarious activities. To

²⁴⁰ Evan Ellis, “Strategic Insights: The Post-Conflict and The Transformation of Colombia’s Armed Forces,” Strategic Studies Institute, August 17, 20016, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/index.cfm/articles/Colombias-Armed-Forces/2016/08/17#.WAPQVnFm6ik.email>.

combat organized criminal groups, the military needs to continue to provide much needed support to the Colombian National Police, especially in rural and poorer areas remote from the principle urban centers.

This study demonstrates the need for a country like Colombia, where internal and external threats converge, to maintain strong military forces. The transition to a post-conflict society does not mean an immediate change in the role played or support that has been provided by the Colombian Marines to the National Police. With that stated, continued support by the Colombian Marines to police forces in their area of operations will reduce future acts of coercion in these former rebel-held areas. Without fear of coercion, citizens will be able to participate equally in the Colombian political system, which is one of the positive factors for sustaining the peace—"political inclusion." The improved level of security will also allow for economic investment, which supports another positive factor. When economic development takes hold in the remote areas of Colombia and the potential for better job opportunities persists, the negative factor of economic grievance will be diminished. After these factors are addressed in the post-conflict environment, the possibility of renewal of conflict will be considerably reduced and the responsibility for public security can revert to the National Police Force. The Colombian Marines can then resume their constitutional mission, "to defend the independence and integrity of the national sovereign territory while maintaining constitutional order."²⁴¹

The Colombian Marines have to initiate a process of transformation and gradually take on its most vital role in the defense of the nation. This adaptation to a new role in the post-conflict period must be gradual, and it must not erase institutional experience and knowledge gained from irregular warfare. Colombia needs to preserve and share its successful experience against its internal adversaries through education and training to allied nations, enabling the exportation of security.

²⁴¹ "Constitución Política de Colombia: Artículo 217," [Colombia Political Constitution] Republica de Colombia, accessed November 6, 2016, <http://www.constitucioncolombia.com/titulo-7/capitulo-7>.

A. TRANSFORMATION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR

The best solution for Colombia is force transformation by focusing on shaping the force, enhancing existing capabilities, and supporting modern training initiatives. Colombia will continue to need security to support the implementation of peace efforts and economic recovery policies. It will require time and a sustained effort by the nation of Colombia and its most important security ally the United States. The security needs of the nation are assessed to be one of the greatest concerns leading to a durable peace. While the military and police forces will need to be ready and able to ensure stability and security, reforms must be instituted to reflect the changing environment. In the post-conflict environment, the military forces will be required to transition from engaging in a brutal internal conflict to supporting efforts for peace. However, the military's capability to wage irregular warfare must be maintained to combat any future internal recurrence of conflict and the multiple illicit organizations not a part of the peace process.

The following argues that continual refinement of the holistic, long-term strategy is needed to refocus the efforts of the Colombian Marines from the immediate threat of combating internally armed insurgent groups to organized crime organizations. Additionally, roles supporting law enforcement will center on countering weapons smuggling, and eventually developing a crisis response force equipped to advise and assist police institutions. This process of building capacity and then transferring authority will be slow and costly, but eventually will allow the armed forces to remain a professional, specialized, and apolitical instrument of national security policy.

During the post-conflict period, the Colombian Marines will undoubtedly continue to support the National Police to fight against illicit organizations profiting from the drug trade. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicates that the number of coca crops in Colombia increased significantly, from 69,000 hectares in 2014 to 96,000 hectares in 2015, representing an increase of 39 percent, and the numbers are continuing to rise.²⁴² A stable and lasting peace will only be achieved by effectively reducing profits from illicit activities. The Colombian Armed Forces' support to civil

²⁴² Juan Umana, "Hectareas de Coca en Colombia Crecen porque Aumento la Demanda," [Hectares of Coca in Colombia Grow because Demand Increased] *Periodico El Colombiano*, March 16, 2016, <http://m.elcolombiano.com/hectareas-de-cultivos-de-coca-crecen-porque-aumento-la-demanda-XI3758404>.

authorities to combat this issue is termed operation, “Sword of Honor,” which is described as:

a counterinsurgency effort launched by the Colombian Armed Forces in 2012 to confront and defeat illegal groups nationwide. Under the initiative, soldiers combat terrorist attacks, dismantle landmines, and persuade hundreds of guerrillas to demobilize and enroll in a government program that provides them with training so they can enter the workforce and peacefully rejoin civil society.²⁴³

By reducing funding streams from the drug trade, the Colombian Armed Forces can effectively control its sovereign territory. The Colombian Marines future functions once the peace agreement with the FARC is approved will continue to include anti-criminal efforts. The Colombian Marines in the post-peace agreement era will need to transition from a military to one of the most vital institutions in Colombia’s state capacity at the forefront of the war on organized crime.

B. EVOLVING ROLES OF COLOMBIAN MARINES

The evolving roles of the Colombian Marines are taking shape, though some still need careful planning and consideration. As previously mentioned, supporting civilian authorities against organized criminal organizations will continue to be a focus area in order to achieve internal security. Another effort after the peace deal is reached will be to support the DDR process by securing FARC assembly areas and preparing to fight a possible recurrence of conflict by armed groups that want to overthrow the government. Another hope for Colombia is to avert institutional “brain drain” by preserving all tactics, techniques, and procedures learned by its forces to combat the FARC and ELN. Sharing this valuable knowledge and experience through education and training activities with other Latin American allies will also enable Colombia to “export security.” The following are recommendations beyond fighting organized crime, supporting the SSR, and preserving experience fighting the counterinsurgency. These recommendations are

²⁴³ Michael lohmuller, “Colombian Military Envisions Future Crime Fighting Role,” *Insight Crime*, April 7, 2016, <http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/colombia-military-envision-future-crime-fighting-role>.

aimed at senior officials of the Colombian Navy and Marines for consideration for the post-conflict period.

The Colombian Marines cannot give up the capabilities to face an unconventional enemy. The Colombian Marines have acquired many skills over many years of internal conflict. In any scenario, the state and the Colombian people will continue to need the efforts, performance, and readiness of the Colombian Armed Forces, not only to defend the territory, but to ensure the country's economic development, by safeguarding the democracy and protecting natural resources.

A main reason why illicit organizations in Colombia have taken advantage of the drug trade is the weakness of territorial security on the borders. When planning a transformation process of the Colombian Marines in the post-conflict period, officials must consider an adaptive role for these forces to conduct operations against internal threats, external threats, and transnational threats. Therefore, the transformation and restructuring of the Colombian Marines should be focused on the relocation of military units to exercise better control on the borders and reduce the economic advantages of terrorist and criminal organizations. Strengthened border control necessarily requires bilateral agreements of security cooperation with other states. This in effect takes advantage of the capabilities of other nations and increases Colombia's capability to confront transnational threats, direct or indirect, that affect all countries with which Colombia shares a border and the broader western hemisphere. For example, the U.S. Border Patrol, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement could partner with Colombia to establish a partnership with the Marines to enhance control over Colombia's sovereign territory by using similar capabilities for patrolling borders, rivers, and coastlines using the latest tactics, techniques, and technologies.

The U.S. and Colombian Marines should develop a stronger military-to-military partnership for investment in Colombia's efforts to preserve counterinsurgency capabilities. These capabilities can be exported to other nations experiencing intrastate conflicts and could reduce the rise in such conflicts. This endeavor could be achieved through the development of a tactical training center such as the one built in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan called the King Abdullah Special Operations Training

Center. The center in Colombia would be a “Center for Colombian Counter-Insurgency Lessons Learned” and along with tactical training would further support writing doctrine and the exportation of lessons to other Latin American countries, serving as way for the United States to export security via Colombia.

Last, Colombia needs to increase its capacity for building large-scale works projects such as those mentioned in the Angola chapter, taking advantage of the nation’s natural resources to develop its economy. Perhaps the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, an agency within the Department of Defense that works to build domestic projects, could be mirrored as a solution for Colombia’s post-conflict development. This hybrid civilian-military agency could take advantage of Colombia’s most trusted government agency, the military, and increase its civilian support for public works projects, thereby creating the environment for economic and political inclusion. This would diminish the possibility for a renewed conflict and increase potential for economic development.

C. FORCE ENHANCEMENT

In the post-peace process era, although a military drawdown maybe inevitable, the force will need enhancing for the military to achieve necessary reforms toward better benefits and increased prestige. To modernize the military and further advance goals, we suggest the following actions: increase pay to a competitive living wage to discourage desertion; make intermediate and advanced training more dynamic to encourage military service members to seek advancement within the service; and instill respect and long-term loyalty to the nation and departments by providing tangible and lasting benefits, such as targeted incentive bonuses, better pensions, and improved health care. Additionally, steps need to be taken to prevent those transitioning out of military service from being recruited by drug cartels and illicit organizations. Job placement and transition services need to link military veterans with opportunities in the private sector or in government jobs. Otherwise, some former soldiers may choose to join organized crime groups, taking military skills with them.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS

As Colombia transitions from fighting with the FARC, it is the perfect time to consider security sector reform that transforms the Marines into an adaptive force for a new era. The reevaluation of troop levels provides an opportunity to shift funding to transformation efforts, which ensures the security needs of Colombia are met. The efforts and investment required to transform Colombia's military organization and equipment, with a renewed focus on improvement and enablement of civilian public security elements, will prove to be difficult. It will be important to capture even the smallest incremental improvements made during this transition; thus, short- and long-term metrics must be established and continually reevaluated.

This study argued that a secure environment is necessary for political and economic well-being in Colombia's post-conflict era. The security of the nation can be accomplished by the Colombian Marines with support in the form of aid and advice from the United States. As Colombia's key security ally, the United States should continue to provide security, training, and aid in rebuilding infrastructure. For a sustainable peace to take hold, Colombia's Armed Forces and National Police must transform to meet the needs of the new environment in a timely manner. The following are recommendations and their corresponding factors to support the Colombian Marines with the backing of the U.S. Military to transform into a post-conflict era force and to sustain the peace:

1. Ensure security to ex-combatants to avoid physical harm throughout the DDR process. Special emphasis should be placed on the reintegration phase to emphasize the perception of trust and security provided by government forces, negating ex-combatants' need for personal weapons: Supports Positive Factor of Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding.
2. Ensure excellent intelligence in the post-conflict era to avert misinformation on location of FARC weapon caches, with exact number of arms and expected condition: Supports Positive Factor of Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, while avoiding the Negative Factor of Coercion.
3. Develop a Rewards for Arms Program, incentivizing the turn-in of weapons used by ex-combatants and civilians with actionable intelligence: Supports Positive Factor of Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Coercion, Weak States, and Greed.

4. Ensure continuity of support from the Colombian Marines to the National Police: Supports Positive Factors of Economic Development and Power-Sharing, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States, Coercion, and Political Exclusion;
5. Ensure the continuity of lessons learned by developing an Irregular Warfare Training Center and Doctrinal Command—partnering with U.S. Special Operations for financial and advisory assistance to mirror the King Abdullah Special Operations Training Center constructed in Jordan: Supports Positive Factor of Economic Development, while avoiding all the Negative Factors from the onset and Recurrence of War.
6. Achieve force transformation:
 - (a) Reduce forces in order to enhance benefits to existing forces.
 - (b) Create Job Placement Center for transitioning service members to government and private sector to avoid skilled service members deserting to organized criminal organizations: Supports Positive Factor of Economic Development.
7. Protect natural resources to avoid the increase in funding channels to insurgent groups and organized criminal organizations: Supports Positive Factors of Economic Development and Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States, Greed, and Economic Grievances.
8. Protect major works projects to support economic development: Supports Positive Factors of Economic Development and Peacekeeping & Peacebuilding, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States and Economic Grievances.
9. Ensure greater border security:
 - (a) Partner with U.S. Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement for enhanced capability: Supports Positive Factor of Economic Development, while avoiding the Negative Factors of Weak States, Greed, and Economic Grievances.

The United States should aid and support in implementing these recommendations during this transformational process. The U.S. Military should support Colombia with foreign aid, credit to purchase up to date weaponry, and send U.S. personnel to advise and assist in reconstruction efforts. For a sustainable peace to take hold, USSOUTHCOM—working as an interagency command—should conduct a full assessment in conjunction with the American Embassy in Bogota, and the USMILGROUP should collaborate with the Colombian Ministry of Defense to determine

all possible support to transition from conflict to peace. With support from the United States, Colombia's security institutions, i.e., the Armed Forces and National Police, must transform to meet the needs of the new environment. By continuing to ensure a strong security environment, the political and economic well-being of Colombia's post-conflict era can be strengthened.

The Colombian Marines should concentrate their efforts on SSR and DDR, but eventually progress into preserving and building upon lessons learned through the counterinsurgency for the exportation of security. These efforts will help to ensure peace by establishing a more secure nation; thus, it is in the best interest of the United States Armed Forces and inter-agencies to help post-conflict Colombia reform for the benefit of sustaining the peace.

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